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ABSTRACT
Employer matching of employee 401(k) contributions can provide a powerful incentive to save for
retirement and is a key component in pension-plan design in the United States.  Using detailed
administrative contribution, earnings, and pension-plan data from the Health and Retirement Study,
this analysis formulates a life-cycle-consistent econometric specification of 401(k) saving and
estimates the determinants of saving accounting for non-linearities in the household budget set
induced by matching.  The participation estimates indicate that an increase in the match rate by 25
cents per dollar of employee contribution raises 401(k) participation by 3.75 to 6 percentage points,
and the estimated elasticity of participation with respect to matching ranges from 0.02-0.07.  The
parametric and semi-parametric estimates for saving indicate that an increase in the match rate by
25 cents per dollar of employee contribution raises 401(k) saving by $400-$700 (in 1991 dollars).
The estimated elasticity of 401(k) saving to matching is also small and ranges from 0.09-0.12
overall, with just under half of this effect on the intensive margin.  Overall, the analysis reveals that
matching is a rather poor policy instrument with which to raise retirement saving.
Gary V. Engelhardt







I.  Introduction 
As 401(k)s have come to dominate the private pension landscape in the United 
States, researchers and policy makers have given increased attention to the impact of plan 
characteristics on retirement-saving decisions.
1  One important characteristic is whether 
and to what extent the employer matches employee contributions.  A typical match might 
be 50 cents for each dollar of contribution, up to a maximum percentage of pay, say, 6 
percent.  Although much of the discussion by the popular press and policy makers 
presumes employer matching raises saving, there is actually strikingly little consensus 
among researchers.  Some studies have found that increases in the match rate raise 401(k) 
saving (Papke and Poterba, 1995; Clark and Schieber, 1998; VanDerhei and Copeland, 
2001; and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002).  Others have found that it is not 
the match rate per se that matters, but whether the firm offers a match at all (Even and 
Macpherson, 1996; Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues, 1998; Papke, 1995; Kusko, Poterba, 
and Wilcox, 1998).  That is, providing a match raises 401(k) saving, but an increase in 
the level of the match rate (conditional on providing a match) does not.  Finally, still 
other studies (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1994; Andrews, 1992; Munnell, 
Sunden, and Taylor, 1998; and GAO, 1997) have suggested that, conditional on being 
eligible for a match, an increase in the match rate lowers 401(k) contributions, which, 
when interpreted in the context of a simple two-period model of saving, suggests that the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect from the higher rate of return matching 
                                                 
1 This includes work on automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and 
Metrick, 2002, 2004), investment in company stock (Poterba, 2003; Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner, 2004; 
Mitchell and Utkus, 2002), portfolio choice and trading in 401(k) plans (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew, 
Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003).     3
provides.
2  Overall, this ambiguity has emerged as an important empirical puzzle in the 
literature on saving behavior (Bernheim, 2003).   
A central shortcoming in this literature has been the failure to exploit the fact that 
employer matching, based either on multiple-match-rate schedules or caps on the 
generosity of the match, results in a non-linear household budget set.  As has been long 
recognized in the study of taxation on labor supply, reduced-form estimates of behavioral 
elasticities are biased and inconsistent unless the non-linearity is accounted for explicitly 
(Hausman, 1985; Moffitt, 1990; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).  Indeed, the presence of 
budget-set kinks may reconcile some of the findings of previous studies: for example, the 
provision of a match may raise 401(k) saving if the substitution effect dominates, but 
variation in match rates may not matter if employees are bunched at kinks.  
  Unlike previous studies, this paper includes a detailed theoretical framework that 
models the budget set defined by employer matching and federal tax treatment as twice 
continuously differentiable and then uses the first-order conditions from the consumer’s 
optimization to derive a life-cycle-consistent econometric specification for 401(k) 
participation.  As an alternative to the maximum-likelihood piecewise-linear-budget-set 
estimation summarized in Hausman (1985)—and the recent, related non-parametric 
extensions by Blomquist and Newey (2002)—and the maximum likelihood 
differentiable-budget-constraint methodology of MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990), 
this paper employs instrumental-variable techniques that linearize the budget set at the 
observed outcome to calculate the price and virtual-income terms and then instruments to 
correct for endogeneity, which also has a long history, but a recent example of which is 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper, “401(k) saving” and “401(k) contributions” are used synonymously as per period 
flows.  In a multi-period model, this would suggest the income effect dominates the substitution and wealth 
effects (Summers, 1981).     4
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999).   To calculate budget-set slopes and virtual income in a 
neighborhood around kink points, kernel regression is used to smooth the budget set non-
parametrically.  We also estimate a censored regression model of 401(k) saving to 
decompose the overall 401(k) saving response between the extensive and the intensive 
margin, where the instrumental-variable Tobit estimator of Newey (1986, 1987b) and an 
instrumental-variable symmetrically censored least squares (SCLS) estimator based on 
Powell (1986) and Newey (1986) are used. 
  Empirically, the paper makes four additional contributions.  First, to circumvent 
difficulties with measurement error in 401(k) contributions and matching incentives that 
have plagued previous studies, administrative data from three sources are used: 
contributions from W-2 earnings records provided by the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS);  detailed matching formulas from pension 
Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) provided by the employers of Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) respondents; and, a combination of Social-Security-covered-earnings 
histories for 1951-1991 and W-2 earnings for 1980-1991, pension SPDs, and pension-
benefit calculators to construct public and private pension entitlements and accruals.  The 
sample consists of 1,042 individuals in 1991 eligible for 401(k) plans in the HRS.   
Second, the analysis includes a calculation of the dollar amount of unused employer 
matching contributions due to workers’ failure to contribute at least until the point at 
which the employer match is exhausted.  Most of this occurs because of non-
participation.  For non-participants, the unclaimed employer match represented 3.7 
percent of pay.  However, even participants left “money on the table” equal to 1 percent 
of pay in unclaimed employer match.  Based on measures of liquidity constraints used by   5
others in the literature, reduced-form evidence is not inconsistent with the presence of 
liquidity constraints as a potential explanation for this phenomenon.  Third, unlike 
previous pension studies that have used the employer-provided SPDs in the HRS, which 
are available only for a non-random sub-sample of HRS respondents, the estimation uses 
methods laid out in Vella (1992) and Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) to correct for 
potential sample selection using a set of plausible exclusion restrictions derived from 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 5500 administrative pension-plan filings.  The 
exclusions have substantial predictive power for determining who is in the analysis 
sample.  There is statistically significant evidence of selection, but the economic impact 
of the selection on the estimates is mixed: the bias is small in the censored regression 
specifications of saving, but larger in the discrete choice participation specifications.   
Finally, there is substantial evidence of the bunching of 401(k) contributions around 
budget-set kink points induced by employer matching: about 25 percent of match-eligible 
individuals are bunched at the kink. 
  The estimates from the life-cycle-consistent discrete choice regression 
specifications for participation indicate that the estimated marginal effect of an increase 
in the employer match rate by 25 cents per dollar of employee contribution raises 401(k) 
participation by 3.75 to 6 percentage points.  When the estimates are expressed in terms 
of elasticities, the results suggest that the impact of the match rate on 401(k) participation 
is quite inelastic: the estimated elasticity of 401(k) participation with respect to the match 
rate ranges from 0.02-0.07.  In addition, the parametric and semi-parametric estimates 
from the two-limit censored regression specifications indicate that the estimated marginal 
effect of an increase in the employer match rate by 25 cents per dollar of employee   6
contribution raises 401(k) contributions by $400-$700 dollars (in constant calendar year 
1991 dollars).  Comparing the Tobit and SCLS estimates using the Hausman-type test in 
Newey (1987a), the validity of the Tobit model cannot be rejected.  When the Tobit 
estimates are expressed in terms of elasticities, the results suggest that the impact of the 
match rate on 401(k) saving is quite inelastic: the estimated elasticity of 401(k) saving 
with respect to the match rate ranges from 0.09-0.12 overall, with just under one half of 
this effect on the intensive (contributions conditional on participation) margin.    
  Overall, because of this very inelastic response on both the intensive and the 
extensive margins, the analysis reveals that for employers and policy makers interested in 
promoting retirement saving by older workers through greater 401(k) participation and 
saving, matching is a rather poor policy instrument.  Roughly speaking, the estimated 
marginal effects in this paper suggest that an increase in the employer match rate of $1 
per $1 of employee contribution would be needed to achieve the same increase in 
participation as the implementation of automatic enrollment, based on the estimates in 
Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002, 2004).   The 
analysis also suggests that government matching of voluntary contributions to any type of 
Social Security personal account would be relatively ineffective in promoting personal-
account contributions (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2005). 
The paper is organized as follows.  Sections II and III lay out the theoretical 
model and first-order conditions that directly motivates the empirical analysis.  Section 
IV lays out the econometric framework and construction of the key variables.  Sections V 
and VI describe the data.  Section VII describes the empirical analysis of the relationship 
between matching and measures of liquidity constraints.  For purposes of comparison   7
with our more structural approach, Section VIII presents estimation results for ad hoc 
reduced-form specification similar to those in the previous literature.  Section IX 
discusses the identification of the structural model, and section X presents the estimation 
results.  There is a brief conclusion. 
   
II. Theoretical Framework 
Previous studies have had two important shortcomings.  First, they have not 
couched their analyses in formal models of intertemporal choice, even though saving 
involves the substitution of resources across time.  This means that previous estimates 
cannot be interpreted as estimates of life-cycle-consistent determinants of 401(k) saving 
necessarily, because the empirical specifications may not have been consistent with 
underlying utility maximization.  So, while the existing literature has provided quite 
informative descriptive analyses, it has said little about how 401(k) saving may respond 
to prospective changes in employer matching or what the optimal match rate should be to 
achieve a saving target.  Second, with the exception of Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and 
Metrick (2002), Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang (2005), and VanDerhei and Copeland (2001), 
previous studies have failed to exploit the fact that multiple-match-rate schedules and 
caps on matching induce kinks in the budget set.    
  By specifying a detailed theoretical framework, this paper represents a stark 
departure from the previous literature.  In an effort to shorten the exposition, the model is 
presented in full in Appendix A and briefly summarized here.  It has nine key features:  
1)  Intratemporal direct utility,  ) ; , ( z l C U , is derived from leisure, l, with an 
associated price, 
l p , consumption of a composite good,C , with an associated 
price, 
c p , and a vector of demographics, z , and is intratemporally weakly 
separable and intertemporally additively separable.    8
 
2)  The consumer faces a per period probability of survival of ρ , with period T 
being the known maximum length of life, and with probability  ρ − 1,  t h e  
consumer dies and receives the terminal payoff  ) (
T W Φ , the utility of bequests, 
which is a function of total wealth, 
T W .   
 
3)  The lifetime is composed of two parts: from periodNtoΤ, the consumer is retired 
and no hours of labor are supplied to the market, so leisure equals the time 
endowment, and from period 0 to  1 - N , the consumer works; the timing of 
retirement in period N is endogenous.   
 
4)  Total wealth is accumulated in seven forms when working: IRAs, 401(k)s, non-
401(k) defined-contribution (DC) pension plans, defined-benefit (DB) pension 
plans, Social Security, housing equity, and taxable wealth.   
 
5)  Retirement-account wealth, defined as the sum of IRA, 401(k), and non-401(k) 
DC assets, and taxable wealth can be invested in risky stocks, with stochastic 
return 
s r , and riskless bonds, and, in addition to the optimal asset allocation 
decision across the different forms of wealth, there is an optimal asset location 
decision, whereby the consumer must decide which assets to hold in taxable and 
tax-deferred forms.   
 
6)  The model specifies in detail non-linearities in the budget set induced by 
employer matching, the tax treatment of 401(k) and IRA contributions, 
respectively, IRA withdrawals, including the tax penalty for early withdrawals 
and minimum-distribution requirements, and the interrelationship between 
employer matching, 401(k) plan characteristics, and the price of leisure.   
 
7)  There are four liquidity constraints: a) non-401(k)-DC, DB and Social Security 
wealth are assumed illiquid until retirement and cannot be used as collateral (in 
accordance with federal law); b) there are constraints on the housing loan-to-value 
ratio for homeowners which limits the amount of mortgage debt that can be held; 
c) 401(k) wealth is assumed illiquid until retirement; and d) there is a cash-on-
hand constraint, such that total per period full expenditure (also referred to as “full 
income” in the two-stage budgeting literature),  y , must be less than or equal to 
total net cash on hand, where the latter is defined as beginning-of-period liquid 
taxable wealth and other income on hand, plus the market value of the leisure 
endowment, less the tax liability, plus any IRA wealth made liquid through a 
withdrawal, less any tax-deferred saving in the form of contributions to the 401(k) 
and IRA. 
 
8)  In each period t, there are minimum- and maximum-contribution constraints on 
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where 
VOL Q  denotes 401(k) contributions, 
IRAC Q  denotes IRA contributions, and 
VOL L  and 
IRA L  are the upper limits on 401(k) and IRA contributions, respectively.  
IRA L  is governed by federal law and depends on marital status and pension 
coverage; 
VOL L  is governed by the employer’s plan, but may not exceed the 
federal statutory maximum.  
 
9)  Each period when working, the consumer chooses consumption, leisure, voluntary 
401(k) contributions, 
VOL Q , IRA contributions, 
IRAC Q ,  IRA withdrawals, the 
housing loan-to-value ratio, and the shares of retirement-account and taxable 
wealth held in risky stocks, respectively.  Each period when retired, the consumer 
chooses consumption, IRA contributions, IRA withdrawals, the housing loan-to-
value ratio, and receives eligible pension and Social Security benefits.  
 
  To summarize, the only forms of “active” saving when working are through 
contributions to 401(k), IRA, or taxable assets; adjustments can be made to the mortgage-
debt position as well.  However, the primary technology for smoothing resources across 
periods when working is through taxable-asset saving, because 401(k) saving is illiquid; 
IRA contributions are not necessarily illiquid because of the availability of withdrawals, 
but IRA withdrawals may incur a tax penalty; traditional pensions and Social Security are 
illiquid; and the extent of mortgage borrowing is limited.  This means that the consumer’s 
optimization does not imply automatically that all active saving be allocated first to the 
tax-preferred asset with the highest net return, because, in the face of uncertainty, the 
consumer must balance the desire for a high return with the need for liquidity.    
 
III.   First-Order Conditions   10
As explained in the data section below, consumption and hours are not fully 
observed in the HRS, so that, from the perspective of the empirical analysis, it is 
desirable to work with the indirect, rather than the direct, utility function.  Specifically, 
let ) ; , ( z p y V  be the intratemporal indirect utility function.  It takes as arguments the 
vector of prices of leisure and consumption, p, full income,  y , and the vector of 
demographics,  z .  Following Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985), let  ) (
* T
t t W V  be the 
sum of current and future expected utility based on total wealth in period t.  The 
individual makes all decisions at the beginning of the period, based on the information 
set,  t Ω , after which, 
s r is realized,E  is the expectations operator conditional on the 
information set, and β  is the discount rate.   
The optimization is expressed in terms of two-stage budgeting.
3   In the first-
stage, the individual chooses full income, dis-saving through IRA withdrawals, the 
mortgage-debt position, and the portfolio allocations to stock of retirement-account and 
taxable wealth, and must allocate total “active” saving to three asset categories─401(k), 
IRA, and taxable wealth─to maximize the expected present discounted value of lifetime 
indirect utility.  In the second stage, optimal full income in each period is allocated 
statically between the goods that enter direct utility: consumption and leisure.   
The first-order conditions when working for 401(k) contributions, IRA 
contributions, and full income can be expressed as 
                                                 
3 The necessary condition for two-stage budgeting is that utility be weakly separable (Gorman, 1959).  The 
model assumes strongly intertemporally and weakly intratemporally separable preferences, so that a two-
stage budgeting interpretation is valid.     11
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V z p ,    (7) 
respectively.  Note that subscripts indicate a partial derivative (other than t, which 
denotes time): for example,  I T  is simply the marginal tax rate; 
V
Q
k M 401  is the marginal 
employer match rate for an additional dollar of 401(k) contribution; ζ is the fraction of 
IRA contributions that is federally tax-deductible;  l y ζ  is the change in the fraction of an 
IRA contribution that is deductible for an additional dollar of adjusted gross income 
(AGI);  y V  is the marginal utility of full income;  t μ  is Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the 
cash-on-hand constraint; and 
RA R  and 
TA R  are the weighted average returns on 
retirement-account and taxable wealth, respectively.  
  Even though the typical employer match yields a net return far exceeding that on 
other assets, so that it would appear obvious that the individual always would want to 
make the maximum possible contribution to the 401(k), equation (5) indicates the role of 
liquidity in the 401(k) contribution decision.  In particular, there are two ways for this 
equation to be satisfied when contributions are less than the plan maximum even when 
the match and tax rates are positive,  0 401 >
V
Q
k M  and  0 > I T , respectively, and these occur 
when the liquidity constraint binds,  0 > μ : (a) the corner solution of no 401(k) saving,   12
for which the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the 401(k) contribution constraints in (1) and 
(2) are  0
0 > η  and  0 =
L η , respectively; and (b) an interior solution, for which  0
0 = η  
and 0 =
L η  (i.e., the contribution is positive, but not at the plan maximum), and the 
multiplier on the liquidity constraint is large enough that the second term just equals the 
first term on the right-hand side of (5).  A particularly important example of this latter 
case is when the contribution is less than the match cap and the employee leaves “money 
on the table” by not contributing up until the point the match is exhausted.  Therefore, 
even in the presence of an employer match, binding liquidity constraints can explain why 
401(k) participation can be less than 100 percent, contributions can be less than the plan 
maximum, and employees rationally can leave money on the table.  This implication of 
the model is examined in Section VII below, in which reduced-form specifications are 
estimated to see whether variables used by others in the literature to measure liquidity 
constraints can explain who fails to contribute at least until the match is exhausted. 
 
IV.  Econometric Specification  
  The major difficulty with the use of (5) as a direct basis for estimating the impact 
of employer matching on 401(k) participation is that most of elements on the right-hand 
side are not fully observed in survey data: who is liquidity constrained, μ ; expectations, 
E; the sum of future expected utility, 
* V ; bequest motives, Φ; and the discount rate, β , 
for example.  To overcome this, define the following tax/match prices,  t It
IRA
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t Q T p ζ − − ≡ , and then combine (5)-(7) to solve out 
for the unobserved elements to yield   13
t
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401 − ≡ Δ .
4    
  Equation (8) motivates the functional form for estimation.  In particular, let the 
indirect utility function take the following form, 
)] ( ln[
)] ( ln[ ) ln(








⋅ Ψ = ,     (9) 
which is a member of the class of the PIGLOG indirect utility functions (Muellbauer, 
1976), that has been used extensively in the literature on consumption.  Following 
Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994), Ψ  is a utility scaling factor that is a function of 
the exogenous demographic characteristics.  In (9), b  is homogeneous of degree zero and 
modeled as a Cobb-Douglas price aggregator  
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across the k  goods that enter the direct utility function, where  0 = ∑
k
k γ . Because there 
are only two goods that enter direct utility, leisure  ) 1 ( = k  and consumption  ) 2 ( = k , 
respectively, this implies  1 2 γ γ − = , so that (10) can be re-written as  
k b
γ ω = ) (p ,          ( 1 1 )  
where 
c l p p / ≡ ω  is the real relative price of leisure.  In addition, a is homogeneous of 
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4 These three prices are not for goods that enter the intratemporal direct utility function and, therefore, are 
not in the price vector p that is an argument in the indirect utility function.   14
The scaling factor Ψ  is modeled as  
∑ = Ψ
m
m i m i z , ) ( ψ z ,       ( 1 3 )  
where  z  is an  1 × m  vector that includes a constant.  The second term on the right-hand 
side of (8) is zero when IRA saving is at an interior solution, positive when constrained 
by the upper IRA limit, and negative when at the lower IRA limit (of zero).  Finally, let 
) (
0 D D p
IRA L m − ≡ κ ,     ( 1 4 )  
where 
IRA L D  is a dummy variable that is one if IRA contributions, which are measured in 
the HRS, are at the upper limit and zero otherwise, and 
0 D  is a dummy variable that is 
one if IRA contributions are zero and zero otherwise.   
Because, as will be illustrated in the discussion of the descriptive statistics, there 
is a very small percentage of workers in the sample whose contributions equal the 401(k) 
plan maximum, we first consider just the participation decision in the empirical analysis, 
so that  η Δ  collapses to 
0 η − , and (8), (12), (13), and (14) combine to yield the following 
discrete choice econometric model 
                  0
1, 2 ln( )
ijt
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where  1 1 /γ ψ δ m m ≡ ,  
* VOL
ijt Q denotes the desired 401(k) contribution, i and  j  index 
individuals and 401(k) plans, respectively, and u  is the error term. Alternatively, this 
framework lends itself naturally to a censored regression model of the determinants of the   15
dollar amount of 401(k) saving (i.e., contributions), where at the upper contribution limit, 
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ijt Q , but  0 =
VOL
ijt Q .  If an increase in the employer match raises participation, then 
the null hypothesis  0 2 15 14 13 12 11 0 = = = = = = = δ δ δ δ δ δ δ  should be rejected, and the 
estimated marginal effects and elasticities of participation and saving to the match rate 
should be positive, respectively.     
In the empirical analysis, z  includes a constant, the worker’s education (in years), 
age, and dummy variables for whether the worker was married, white, and female, 
respectively.  These demographic characteristics enter parsimoniously and allow the 
impact of employer matching to be heterogeneous across demographic groups.  The last 
term on the right-hand side of (15) includes x, a vector that contains a constant and 
exogenous employer and employment characteristics.  These are additional factors, 
explained in section X below, that fall outside of the scope of the theoretical framework, 
but may affect contributions.  In the baseline specifications, x is limited to a constant; 
additional specifications allow the employer and employment characteristics to enter x.  
       
V.    Data  
   Previous research primarily has used nationally representative, individual-level 
survey data, such as the Current Population Studies (CPS) and Surveys of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), which are plagued by two important sources of measurement error.   
First, even though the researcher must know the entire match schedule for a plan to 
account for the individual’s full opportunity set, as well as whether the match is 
discretionary or through profit-sharing, the typical survey respondent has great difficulty   16
in accurately conveying even relatively simple pension provisions to interviewers, no less 
detailed matching schedules.
5  Second, self-reported contribution data also suffer from 
substantial reporting error.  In addition, as the theoretical framework showed, the data 
required to model saving are quite extensive: contributions, components of household 
(including spousal) income, assets, debts, demographics, marginal tax rates, spousal 
pension coverage, and expected entitlements from Social Security and traditional 
pensions, which require lifetime and job earnings histories, respectively.  Previous studies 
have not had all of these data.   
In this paper, these problems are overcome by using remarkably detailed data 
from the first wave of the HRS, a nationally representative random sample of 51-61 year 
olds and their spouses (regardless of age).  The first wave asked detailed questions about 
wealth (including IRA and taxable assets), demographics, and spousal characteristics in 
1992.  The survey also asked detailed questions about household income, tax 
information, and IRA contributions, but, as is true in many household surveys, these 
questions were for the previous calendar year, 1991.  So, for the purposes of the empirical 
analysis, periods t and  1 + t  refer to 1991 and 1992, respectively.   
Questions on employment were asked for the job (if any) held at the time of the 
interview, as well as previous jobs.  A unique feature of these data is that the HRS used 
the job rosters from the household interviews and collected Summary Plan Descriptions 
(SPDs), which are legal descriptions of pensions written in plain English, from employers 
of HRS respondents for all current and previous jobs in which the respondent was 
covered by a pension.  These descriptions help to sidestep the problems with 
                                                 
5 See Mitchell (1988), Starr-McCluer and Sunden (1999), Johnson, Sambamoorthi, and Crystal (2000), 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), Rohwedder (2003a, 2003b), and Engelhardt (2001) for evidence on 
measurement error in pension data.     17
measurement error outlined above, and, instead, measure the exact incentives to 
contribute by using the employer matching formulas given in the SPD.
6   Specifically, the 
job in which the respondent was employed in 1991 was identified and then SPDs 
associated with that job that had dates of adoption after 1991 were excluded.  In addition, 
the date of last amendment and dates for changes in plan provisions indicated in the text 
of the SPD were used to exclude plans that were in existence in 1991 but whose features 
changed between 1991 and the time the SPD was collected.     
The HRS also asked in the first wave the respondents’ permission to link their 
survey responses to administrative earnings data from SSA and IRS.  These 
administrative data include Social Security covered-earnings histories from 1951-1991 
and W-2 earnings records for jobs held from 1980-1991, and were made available for use 
under a restricted-access confidential data agreement.  They are the basis for two critical 
measures in the analysis dataset.  First, the W-2 data provide administrative data on 
earnings and 401(k) contributions for 1991.  Unlike the contributions data used in 
previous studies, these data are not subject to measurement error, as they are the 
employer’s official report to the government on annual earnings and elective deferrals.  
Second, when combined, the W-2 earnings histories, Social Security covered-earnings 
histories and self-reported earnings histories, allowed for the construction of complete 
earnings histories from 1951-1991 for each member of our sample.  When used with 
Social Security and pension-benefit calculators, which are described in Appendix B, 
these data allowed for the calculation of the public and private pension wealth, accruals 
and changes in accruals, for 1991 and 1992, respectively.   
                                                 
6 The data appendix explains why self-reported pension information was not used and some other data 
limitations in the HRS.    18
Overall, when all of the sources are combined, the data are a comprehensive 
description of the household’s financial situation and exact pension incentives in 1991 
and 1992 with which to estimate the parameters in the empirical specification in (15) and 
a significantly richer data source than previous studies.   Specifically, the sample consists 
of 1,042 HRS individuals eligible to contribute to a 401(k) in 1991.  
   
 
VI. Descriptive Statistics 
Many plans limit the amount of the match.  These caps are usually expressed as a 
percent of pay in the SPD, but also can be a percent of contributions, and even a fixed-
dollar amount.  Table 1 shows the distribution of matching caps in the analysis sample, 
expressed as a percent of annual pay.  About 19 percent of these plans had caps on 
employer matching that were less than four percent of pay.  The median cap was 6 
percent of pay, but 15 percent of plans had higher caps.  Plans also vary according to the 
match rate. Table 2 shows the distribution of “first-dollar” match rates in the analysis 
sample.  Columns 1 and 2 indicate that these match rates were clustered at 25, 50, and 
100 percent, where the median match rate was 50 percent.  However, 27 percent of the 
plans offered matches of 100 percent, and three plans offered match rates of 200 percent.   
Descriptive statistics for selected variables used in the empirical analysis are 
shown in Table 3.  Column 1 shows sample means for the full sample, with the standard 
deviation in parentheses, and the median in square brackets.  Overall, the sample consists 
of mostly white, married individuals in their mid-50s, with some college education and 
relatively few children at home.  Only 56.4 percent of the sample actively participated 
(defined as having made a positive contribution) in 1991.   The sample mean 401(k)   19
contribution in calendar year 1991 was $1,377, but among contributors, the average 
contribution was $2,446 (shown in column 4).  Only 3 percent of the sample made the 
maximum contribution.   
Figure 1 plots the distribution of 401(k) contributions for the match-eligible 
individuals in the sample in intervals of $200 relative to the kink amount.  As illustrated 
in the figure, there is substantial bunching of contributions at the kink (measured as the 
value 0 on the horizontal axis).  About 25 percent of match-eligible individuals locate at 
or within $400 of the kink on their budget sets.   
A comparison of contributions between those without and with employer 
matching in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, respectively, indicates that individuals with 
matching contributed just over $400 more on average than those without matching (i.e., 
$1,640-$1,232=$408).  The difference in the median contributions between these two 
groups was $800.    Therefore, just based on a comparison of means, it would appear that 
there is a small response of 401(k) saving to matching. 
A comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 also indicates that plans with 
employer matching differ along other dimensions that may make saving attractive.  For 
example, if there is an employer match, the individual is much more likely to be able to 
borrow against the plan balance, direct the investment of plan balances, less likely to 
have another traditional pension plan, more likely to have the plan annual contribution 
limit lower than the federal limit, and more likely to be allowed to make after-tax 
contributions to the plan. 
 
VII.    Explaining Unused Employer Matching Contributions   20
Because the typical employer match yields a return far exceeding that on 
alternative investments, 401(k) participation would be predicted to be 100 percent if all 
individuals were fully informed, financially rational, with access to perfect capital 
markets and no transactions costs.  In addition, at a minimum, all participants would be 
predicted to maximize total compensation and contribute up to the point at which the 
employer match was exhausted and then engage in a set of borrowing and lending 
arrangements to achieve the desired level of consumption and leisure.
7   Yet in Table 3, 
401(k) participation is 56.4 percent among all sample individuals, and only 54 percent 
among those offered a match.  This suggests that individuals left “money on the table” by 
not capturing the total potential employer match. 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the total potential employer match in the sample for 
individuals eligible for a match.  The mean potential match was $1,249, or 3.8 percent of 
annual pay.  The average employer match that went unused because contributions were 
not made up to the level of the match cap was $550, or 1.9 percent of pay.  Naturally, 
non-participants accounted for most of this, with the unused match equal to 3.7 percent of 
pay (column 3).  Even more striking, though, is that among participants the average 
unused employer match represented 1 percent of pay (column 2).
8  
As described in the theoretical framework, one possible explanation for this is that 
individuals were liquidity constrained.  To explore this, ad hoc reduced-form models 
were estimated measuring whether and to what extent the 401(k) contribution was less 
than the cap on the employer match as a function of a set of explanatory variables that 
                                                 
7 A similar argument would imply that all individuals would be predicted to contribute up to the plan limit, 
and engage in a set of borrowing and lending arrangements to achieve the desired consumption and leisure, 
and thus exploit the tax arbitrage from deferral to minimize the lifetime tax liability.  
8 Choi et al. (2005) and Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang (2005) have similar findings using various sets of 
company data.   21
measure (to varying degrees) the ability to borrow, which have been used by others in the 
previous literature on liquidity constraints, but none of which measure such constraints 
definitively: demographics (white, age, married, and years of education); dummy 
variables for whether the household has no capital income; has access to borrowing 
against home equity through a home equity line of credit, conditional on being a home 
owner; has experienced financial distress in the past due to unanticipated medical 
expenses and unemployment, respectively; and has access to informal private support 
from friends and family if under financial distress.
9      
The results are shown in Table 5 for the sub-sample of individuals offered a 
match.  Sub-sample means are shown in column 1.  Column 2 shows estimates from a 
probit model in which the dependent variable is one if the individual contributed below 
the employer match cap (including a zero contribution) and zero otherwise.  Individuals 
who were more educated or with a home equity line of credit were statistically 
significantly less likely to have contributed below that match cap, whereas those 
individuals who had financial distress from unanticipated medical expenses or no capital 
income were statistically significantly more likely to have contributed below that match 
cap.  Columns 3 and 4 show estimates for Tobit models of the dollar amount and the 
percentage of pay of the unused employer match, respectively, and the results are 
qualitatively similar.   These results are not inconsistent with the theoretical result that 
                                                 
9  This section of the paper includes the results of ad hoc reduced-form models of the impact of liquidity 
constraints on “money on the table” only to provide some evidence in support of (or at least not 
inconsistent with) the mechanism in the theoretical framework that would explain individuals’ failure to 
fully exploit the employer matching and tax-deferral in 401(k)s—namely, liquidity constraints.  In 
particular, measures of liquidity constraints used by others in the literature are used here simply for 
comparative purposes.  There are at least two other explanations for the presence of unused employer 
matching contributions, imperfect information and present-biased preferences, both of which we discuss in 
the appendix.   22
constrained borrowing is a plausible explanation for why workers fail to capture the total 
potential employer match.  
 
VIII.    Ad Hoc Reduced-Form Estimation Results 
To compare the non-linear budget set approach with that from the previous 
literature, this section gives the estimation results from a series of ad hoc reduced-form 
specifications similar in spirit to those in the literature, using the same estimators as used 
in the literature, but with the HRS data.  Selected parameter estimates are shown in Table 
6.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
    Column 1 shows a probit specification for the decision to contribute to the 401(k) 
plan in 1991.  In columns 2-4, the dependent variable is the dollar amount of 
contributions.  Contributions are modeled as a function of earnings, demographics, a 
dummy for whether the firm matches contributions and the marginal match rate in 
column 2.  Column 3 expands the specification to include quartic functions in age and 
earnings.  Column 4 presents one-limit Tobit estimates.  Like previous studies, all 
specifications in the table indicate that the presence of a match raises contributions.   
However, conditional on offering a match, the point estimates suggest that increases in 
the match rate may increase or decrease contributions, but none of these effects are 
statistically significant.  The estimated elasticity of contributions with respect to the 
match rate (conditional on having been offered a match) is shown in the last row of the 
table for each specification, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
IX.   Estimation and Identification in the Non-Linear Budget Set Framework   23
  The estimation of the parameters in (15) employs an instrumental-variable 
technique that linearizes the budget set at the observed outcome to calculate the price and 
virtual income terms and then instruments to correct for endogeneity.  In particular, for 
all observed 401(k)-contribution outcomes in the dataset, the tax and match prices, 
IRA p , 
m p , and 
k p
401 , the net wage, ω , and full income,  y , must be calculated in order to 
construct ) ln( / ω y p Δ  and κ  in (18).  Because budget-set slopes are not defined at kink 
points, a variant of the method of MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) was used to 
calculate 
IRA p , 
m p , and 
k p
401  for each individual in the sample.  Specifically, the 
matching formulas in the SPDs, tax-rate information from NBER’s TAXSIM calculator, 
and detailed household financial and demographic characteristics were used to lay out the 
budget set in detail, then the kinks in the budget set were smoothed non-parametrically 
using kernel regression of the implicit (negative) tax rate from the employer matching 
and tax subsidy to contributions on AGI over the federal legally allowable range of 
401(k) contributions of 0 to $9500 using a second-order Gaussian kernel, 
2 /
2
) 2 / 1 ( ) (
z e z K
− = π , with bandwidth chosen by Silverman’s rule of thumb, 
5 / 1 / 9 . 0 n m h = , where  ) 349 . 1 / , var min( x x iqr m =  and iqrx is the inter-quartile range.
10   
This regression was done on an individual-by-individual basis, so that the smoothing is 
individual-budget-set specific, and the estimates allow for budget-set slopes to be 
measured for those individuals located at kink points.   
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10 See Appendix A for details.     24
and includes the market value of the leisure endowment.  Under two-stage budgeting, the 
capital income and net (dis-)saving terms embodied in  A Δ  are sufficient statistics for the 
past and the expectations of future variables (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999).  Because of 
the non-linear structure of matching and marginal tax rates, the tax and match prices, 
IRA p , 
m p , and 
k p
401 , change depending upon the budget-set segment (either because the 
marginal match rate or tax rate changes), and, hence, the taxes-paid measure, T , which, 
in turn, incorporates the dollar amount of the implicit tax liability from the employer-
matching and tax subsidies, will change depending upon the budget-set segment as well.  
Therefore, full income is actually measured as “virtual” full income, 
v y , according to the 
respective budget segment, where 
v T  denotes the associated implicit tax liability, which 
is calculated by numerically integrating the estimated kernel-smoothed implicit tax 
function described above.  
Unfortunately, the explanatory variables in (18) have components based on choice 
variables.  Therefore, the instrument set, Z, includes the vector of demographics, z , and 
three additional variables, 
FC
it Z 1 − , 
IRAz mz p p ⋅ , and 
kz p
401 : the first is a dummy variable if 
the household was in poor financial condition in 1990, and the second and the third are 
based on “first-dollar” match and marginal tax rates for a synthetic taxpayer in 1989.
11  
There are two primary sources of variation in the instruments.  First, 
mz p  varies by plan, 
j .   T h a t  i s ,  i t  i s  a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e  v a r i ation in matching schedules across plans is 
exogenous.  Second, 
IRAz p  and 
kz p
401  vary across synthetic individuals because the tax 
                                                 
11 We also estimated the model by additionally controlling for directly for demographic characteristics by 
including the vector z  in x .  We could not reject the null hypothesis that these additional variables jointly 
had no impact on 401(k) participation.  This suggests that the demographic characteristics do not have an 
effect separate from their interactions with the matching terms.  We do not report these results, but they are 
available upon request.   25
function is non-linear in income and marital status.   Appendix B gives a detailed 
description of the construction of the instruments and discusses the sources of 
identification in detail.     
      A final issue is that the sample is likely non-random because it is based on 
individuals for whom the HRS was able to obtain an employer-provided SPD for the 
401(k) plan.  Although previous pension studies using the HRS employer-provided SPDs 
have not corrected for selection because of the lack of plausible exclusion restrictions, 
two exclusion restrictions based on IRS Form 5500 data were used to estimate the model 
using a number of methods to correct for selection.  The first exclusion is the incidence of 
pension-plan outsourcing by Census region, employment-size category, one-digit SIC 
code, and union status (union plan vs. non-union plan) cell in 1992, where outsourcing 
means the plan was administered by an entity other than the employer.  The intuition is 
that the HRS is less likely to obtain an SPD from the employer if (on average in its cell) 
plan administration is outsourced, because more than one contact is needed (first the 
employer, then the plan administrator) to receive the SPD.  The second exclusion is the 
incidence of pension-plan consolidation due to mergers and acquisitions by cell from 
1988-1992.  The intuition is that the HRS is less likely either to obtain an SPD from the 
employer or match it to the employee if (on average in its cell) there has been a lot of 
plan consolidation, because plan names and detail are often changed upon consolidation.  
Finally, two other variables based on HRS data were used as exclusions in the selection 
equations: dummies for whether the individual left the job because the business closed or 
was laid off, respectively.  These help to measure whether the employer possibly was in 
financial difficulty at severance, which, if that resulted in a business failure, would have   26
made it more difficult for the HRS to have obtained an SPD.  The construction of the 
exclusions and the selection equation are discussed in detail in Appendix B. 
 
X.   Estimation Results  
The parameters in (15) are estimated in the baseline specification, in which the 
vector x in is limited to a constant, by maximum likelihood, where  ) , 0 ( ~
2 σ N u .  Panel 
A of Table 7 presents parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
12  Panel B 
lists the set of additional explanatory variables in the models.  Column 1 shows the 
parameter estimates for the baseline specification without instrumenting.  The marginal 
effect for a one unit change in the match rate represents an increase of one dollar of 
match per dollar of employee contribution and is shown in Panel.
13  The estimated 
marginal effect of an increase in the match rate by one dollar is an increase in 
participation of 0.0091 or nine-tenths of a percentage point, which is economically 
extremely small and statistically different than zero, based on the p-value for the test of 
the null hypothesis of no impact of employer matching shown in panel A.  The estimated 
marginal effect for virtual full income is negative, consistent with consumption and 
leisure as normal goods, statistically significantly different than zero, but, again, the 
economic magnitude of the income elasticity is very small.    
Column 2 gives the instrumental-variable estimates.  In panel B, an increase in the 
match rate of one dollar increases contributions by an estimated 27 percentage points and 
is statistically different than zero.  This estimate is substantially larger than the one in 
column 1 without instrumenting, which indicates substantial downward bias in the 
                                                 
12 The standard errors account for the presence of the estimated selection-correction and the use of 
instrumental variables.  
13 The 95% bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence interval is shown in square brackets.   27
estimated match effect from endogeneity.   In column 2, the income effect is negative and 
indicates that an increase of one unit in virtual full income, which represents an increase 
of $100,000, results in an estimated reduction in the probability of participation of eight 
percentage points.  The income effect, as well as the impact of the net wage and the 
marginal tax rate, are all significant at less than the 0.0001 level of significance for all of 
the specifications in Table 7.   
To get a better sense of the economic magnitude of these marginal effects, Panel 
D shows the estimated elasticity of participation with respect to the employer match rate, 
evaluated at the sample means.  In column 2, the estimated elasticity is 0.07: if the 
employer match were raised from twenty-five to fifty cents (i.e., doubled), participation 
would rise by seven percent (not percentage points).
14   Thus, 401(k) participation 
appears to be quite inelastic with respect to the employer match.  The estimated income 
elasticity is -0.10; the estimated net wage elasticity is  04 . 0 − ; and the estimated elasticity 
with respect to the marginal tax rate is 0.04, so that 401(k) participation also is very 
inelastic with respect to the tax price.    
Panel A also shows the parameter estimates on the exclusion restrictions in the 
selection model.
15  The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the exclusions 
jointly do not explain who has a matched SPD, though not shown in the table, is less than 
0.01, which indicates the exclusions have predictive power for who is in the sample.  In 
particular, greater plan outsourcing, consolidation, business closure and layoffs 
significantly decrease the likelihood of having a matched SPD.  The parameter estimate 
on the selection term in the participation equation is negative, and, based on the 
                                                 
14 The estimated elasticities are very similar when based on individual characteristics. 
15  Parameter estimates for the full selection model are available upon request.   28
associated standard error, the null hypothesis of no selection bias can be rejected at the 3 
percent level of significance.  This is evidence of selection: high savers are less likely to 
have an employer-provided SPD in the HRS, consistent with the reduced-form analysis 
of Gustman and Steinmeier (1999).  To gauge whether this selection is economically 
important, column 3 shows the IV results without selection correction.  The estimated 
participation elasticity with respect to the match rate in Panel E is now 0.19, which is 
more than double the selection-corrected elasticity of 0.07 in column 2.  This indicates 
that the bias from estimating the determinants of 401(k) participation on the selected 
sample of the respondents in the HRS who have matched SPDs has a substantial effect on 
the economic magnitude of the employer match estimates.   
 
Robustness Checks and Extensions 
There are two practical concerns in the estimation that fall outside of the scope of 
the theoretical framework.  First, firms may offer employer matching contributions as a 
way to try to avoid failing federal pension non-discrimination rules because they have 
low-saving employees (McGill, et al., 1996). This would tend to bias downward the 
estimated match elasticity.  Second, firms that match may adopt other plan features to 
stimulate employee saving (e.g., allow for borrowing against plan balances, self-directed 
investment, offer after-tax saving options, offer retirement seminars, etc.) or offer 
different fringe benefit packages that might affect saving behavior than firms that do not 
match.  This would tend to bias upward the estimated match elasticity.   
The reduced-form relationship between employer match rates and these factors 
using the HRS data was examined in a companion paper, Engelhardt and Kumar (2004a).    29
As described there, the non-discrimination rules are set up so that employers with a 
greater proportion of workers with earnings large enough to be deemed “highly-
compensated employees” under federal law face greater pressure to meet non-
discrimination rules if they offer a 401(k).  In particular, a variable that measured the 
share of workers with earnings above the federal threshold for the definition of a “highly-
compensated” employee under federal non-discrimination regulations in the respondent’s 
Census-region-by-employment-size-category-by-one-digit-SIC-code-by-union-status cell 
in 1989 was constructed from the March CPS.  This measure was then weighted by the 
difference in combined federal and state marginal tax rates on earnings for the median 
highly- and non-highly-compensated workers in the cell to reflect the value a highly-
compensated worker would put on a dollar of tax-deferred salary through a 401(k) 
relative to that for a non-highly-compensated worker.  This tax-difference-weighted share 
was used as a measure of the non-discrimination “pressure” faced by the typical 
employer in the respondent’s cell in a reduced-form model of the determinants of match 
rates in the HRS data.  
The estimation results in Engelhardt and Kumar (2004a) showed that the measure 
of pressure and other plan characteristics were highly significant.  For example, the 
greater the pressure (tax-difference-weighted share) the more likely the respondent’s plan 
offered a match and the higher the match rate.  Also, plans that allowed borrowing, self-
directed investment, had other traditional features, had limits less than the federal limit, 
and after-tax saving options had significantly higher first-dollar employer match rates, as   30
was suggested in the comparison of unconditional means in Table 3 of the current 
paper.
16   
With this in mind, two groups of additional explanatory variables were included 
in the vector  x  in (15) for the specification in Table 7: 1) fringe benefits offered: dummy 
variables for whether the firm offered long-term disability and group term life insurance, 
respectively, as well as the number of health insurance plans, number of retiree health 
insurance plans, weeks paid vacation, and days of sick pay; 2) other plan characteristics: 
dummy variables for whether the 401(k) allowed borrowing, hardship withdrawals, self-
directed investment, had an after-tax saving option, a 401(k) contribution limit less than 
the federal limit, respectively, whether the firm offered other traditional pensions, and the 
measure of non-discrimination “pressure” described above.  
Column 4 Table 7 shows the estimation results for this specification.  In 
particular, in panel B, the estimated marginal effect of a one-dollar increase in the match 
rate is an increase in participation of 0.09, or nine percentage points.  The estimated 
match rate elasticity, Panel E, is 0.02, compared to 0.07 in column 2, so that the addition 
of the fringe benefit and other plan characteristics has an important impact on the results.   
The estimated marginal effects for income, net wage, and the marginal tax rate also 
decline relative to those in the baseline specifications in column 2. 
In column 5, a third set of explanatory variables was added to  x  in (15): 3) 
additional employment characteristics: dummy variables for both the worker and spouse 
for whether the firm offered a retirement seminar, discussed retirement with co-workers, 
                                                 
16 Another potential concern is that high-saving individuals, such as those with long horizons, might sort to 
firms that offer employer matching contributions (Ippolito, 1997). This would tend to bias upward the 
estimated elasticity of voluntary contributions to matching.  However, the estimation results in Engelhardt 
and Kumar (2004a) showed no correlation of the employer match rate with measures of the demographics 
and horizon and offered no support for endogenous sorting.   31
whether responsible for the pay and promotion of others, the number of supervisees, 
spousal pension coverage, as well as controls for firm size, Census division, and union 
status.  These additional employment characteristics were interacted with the fringe 
benefit and plan characteristics described above to allow a more flexible functional form 
for  x α  in (15).  The estimated marginal effects for the match rate, income, net wage, 
and marginal tax rate are shown in column 5, respectively, are similar to those in the 
baseline specifications in columns 2 and 4, respectively.  The estimated elasticity of 
participation to the match rate rises to 0.05 in Panel E.   
Finally, to allow for a significantly more flexible functional form for  x α  in (15), 
in column 6, occupation dummies were added; the fringe benefit, plan, and other 
employment characteristics were interacted with occupation; and, the other plan 
characteristics were interacted with the fringe benefit variables.  Hence, the specification 
in column 6 is essentially fully interactive in the elements of x.  The estimated elasticity 
of participation to the match rate rises to 0.06 (column 6, Panel E).    
As noted in section IV, the demographic characteristics enter (15) parsimoniously, 
in a manner that allows the impact of employer matching to be heterogeneous across 
demographic groups.  Across columns in Table 7, the demographic group for which the 
employer match consistently appears to have statistically significant differential effects 
on contributions is the relatively highly educated.  To highlight any differences in 
responsiveness across groups, Table 8 shows the estimated marginal effect and 
elasticities for the employer match rate by sex and education group for the richest 
specification, shown in column 6 of Table 7.  In columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, an increase 
in the match rate of one dollar increases participation of females and males by an   32
estimated 22.6 and 17.5 percentage points, respectively.  However, the estimated 95% 
confidence intervals around these estimates overlap substantially and these effects are not 
statistically different from each other.   In columns 3-7, the marginal effect as well as 
elasticities rises sharply by education group.
17   
 
Estimates from the Censored Regression Model 
We also estimated (15) as a two-limit censored regression model of 401(k) saving 
in an instrumental-variable Tobit framework using the estimator of Newey (1986, 
1987b), which allowed us to decompose the overall saving responses between the 
extensive and the intensive margins, respectively, based on the method of McDonald and 
Moffitt (1980). In addition, we used an instrumental-variable version of the 
Symmetrically Censored Least Squares (SCLS) estimator of Powell (1986) and Newey 
(1986, 1987b).  The primary advantage of this semi-parametric estimator is that it robust 
to heteroscedasticity and any departures to normality that were assumed for the Tobit 
error term.  
                                                 
17 The marginal effect and elasticity with respect to the match rate rises monotonically with education until 
college degree. For those with graduate degrees, however, the elasticity is lower even though marginal 
effects are higher. This is due to lower match rate and higher participation rates at which the elasticity has 
been calculated for this group.   In addition to the robustness checks indicated in Table 7, specifications 
were estimated based on the more general Box-Cox functional form for indirect utility from Blundell, 






























which nests the PIGLOG function we use.  These results, which appeared in the version of the paper 
presented at the TAPES conference, were very consistent with the results shown in Tables 7 and 8, and, 
therefore, were not included in the current version for the purposes of exposition.  They are available from 
the authors upon request.   
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Table 9 presents a parallel set of results from the censored specification to those 
in Table 7 for the discrete choice model of participation.
18  Overall, the general pattern of 
estimated responses is very similar to those from the binary choice specification in Table 
7.  Panel E shows the decomposition of the total elasticities into elasticities along the 
extensive (participation) and intensive (contributions conditional on participation) 
margins, respectively.
19  Columns 5 and 6 present results from the richest specification 
using IV Tobit and IV SCLS, respectively.  The latent marginal effects from the 
parametric and semi-parametric estimates in these two columns indicate that an increase 
in the match rate by one dollar per dollar of employee contribution raises 401(k) saving 
by $2261 and $1522 (in 1991 dollars) respectively. The estimated elasticity of 
contributions to the match rate is 0.12 (column 5, Panel E), with more than one half of 
this elasticity on the extensive margin which suggests that participation is relatively more 
responsive to variation in the employer match than contributions. The elasticities on the 
extensive (participation) margin are very similar the estimates from the discrete choice 
                                                 
18  The estimation uses methods laid out in Vella (1992) and Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) for the Tobit 
and SCLS estimators, respectively, to correct for potential sample selection.  Parameter estimates for the 
full selection model are available upon request.   The first-stage regressions for the endogenous variables in 
(15) were selection corrected as well. 
19 One drawback of the SCLS estimator is that the total, extensive-, and intensive-margin match rate 
elasticities shown in panel E cannot be calculated from the estimates.  In addition to SCLS, the 
specifications were estimated using an instrumental-variable version of Powell’s CLAD estimator extended 
to allow for two limits, with the upper limit varying across individuals, as is dictated by these data, 
accounting for selection using the method of Blundell and Powell (2004) for semiparametric estimators.  
The CLAD point estimates produced marginal effects that were very similar to the SCLS and Tobit 
estimated marginal effects shown in Table 8.  However, when bootstrapping the standard errors, the 
estimator frequently failed to converge.  In particular, as is well-known for LAD estimators, the estimator 
can fail to converge when the specification becomes more and more saturated with control variables and 
the cells become thin, as in the richer specifications in subsequent columns in Table 8.  This is a 
particularly severe problem for CLAD estimators that rely on iterative trimming of the data when the 
analysis dataset is not large, because the estimation dataset becomes smaller with each iteration, even 
though the number of explanatory variables remains the same.  In this application, the estimation algorithm 
trimmed the original 1,042 observations down to around 400 by the last iteration.  For this reason, reliable 
bootstrapped standard errors were not able to be obtained for CLAD estimates and they are not shown in 
Table 8.      34
participation model in Table 7.  Finally, Based on a Hausman-type test (Newey, 1987a), 
we could not reject the IV Tobit model in favor of the IV SCLS specification.  
Table 10 shows the estimated marginal effect and elasticities for the employer 
match rate by sex and education group for the richest specification, shown in column 10 
of Table 9. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 10, an increase in the match rate of one dollar 
increases contributions of females and males by an estimated $1,153 and $1,752, 
respectively.  The results for the education groups echo those from the discrete choice 
model of participation in Table 8, both marginal effects and elasticities rise sharply with 
education.   
 
XI. Summary and Implications  
Previous studies have produced a puzzling array of estimates of the impact of 
employer matching on 401(k) saving.  This probably stemmed from the use of less than 
ideal data and, more importantly, the failure to incorporate into estimation match-induced 
kinks in the budget set.  Overall in this analysis, based on the life-cycle consistent 
specification derived, the estimated elasticity of 401(k) participation with respect to the 
match rate ranged from 0.02-0.07, and, hence, participation was quite inelastic with 
respect to employer matching, a pattern that was apparent even in a simple comparison of 
means. The estimated elasticities of 401(k) saving from a censored regression model 
ranged from 0.09-0.12 with just under half of this response on the intensive margin.  
There are two obvious limitations of these findings.  First, the focus was on older 
workers, for whom the very detailed data for this type of study were available; whether 
the estimates apply to younger workers is an open question.  Second, this study has   35
nothing to say about the broader question of to what extent 401(k) saving constitutes new 
private saving, a point of substantial debate in the literature.  
  Given these caveats, there are a number of potential implications of these 
findings.  First, because of the estimated inelastic response on both the intensive and the 
extensive margins, the analysis reveals that for employers and policy makers interested in 
promoting retirement saving by older workers through greater 401(k) participation and 
saving, matching is a rather poor policy instrument.  Roughly speaking, the estimated 
marginal effects in this paper suggest that an increase in the employer match rate of $1 
per $1 of employee contribution would be needed to achieve the same increase in 
participation as the implementation of automatic enrollment, based on the estimates in 
Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002, 2004).     
Automatic enrollment would seem to be a much more effective way to increase 
retirement saving.  Second, a number of commonly-advocated reforms to Social Security 
call for the introduction of voluntary private accounts, to which individuals could choose 
to contribute additional funds toward Social Security.  Under some proposals, the federal 
government would match those contributions as an incentive.  In designing such a 
system, it would be instrumental for policy makers to know how individual contributions 
would respond to the government match.  Our analysis suggests that government 
matching of voluntary contributions to any type of Social Security personal account 
would be relatively ineffective in promoting personal-account contributions (Engelhardt 
and Kumar, 2005).  Third, beyond personal accounts, there is substantial policy interest 
in the government provision of matching contributions designed to stimulate targeted 
forms of saving among lower income households, which has led researchers to evaluate   36
the impact of Individual Development Accounts (IDA) [Mills, Gale, Patterson, and 
Apostolov, 2006], federal programs for matching IRA contributions, and the adoption of 
the Saver’s Credit [Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez, 2006].  In particular, the 
Mills, et al. and Duflo, et al. analyses, which were based on randomized field 
experiments, have shown substantially more elastic responses from matching 
contributions on IDA and IRA contributions, respectively.   
Our reading of these two studies suggests that their findings are difficult to 
extrapolate to employer matching contributions in corporate 401(k) plans for three 
reasons.  First, eligible employees in 401(k) plans are not typically lower income 
individuals.  They are more likely to be substantially better off economically.  For 
example, individuals in the Mills et al. analysis had incomes below 150 percent of the 
poverty line.  Second, institutional features differ substantially.  For example, 
contributions to a 401(k) plan that are matched are typically done through automatic 
payroll deduction, whereas contributions to IDAs and IRAs in the Mills, et al. and Duflo, 
et al. analyses were not.  Third, the matching contributions in the Duflo, et al. analysis 
were offered as part of an unannounced, take-it-or-leave-it decision, whereas employees 
in a 401(k) can respond to a match by contributing at any point in a given calendar year, 
or even a different calendar year, without foregoing the option of being eligible for a 
match.  Overall, although these are fascinating studies that will have important 
implications for policy targeted to lower income households and, through randomization, 
have convincingly addressed important issues in the econometric identification of the 
causal effects of matching, these studies are of limited use in formulating policy 
concerning 401(k) plans.     37
Finally, a number of prominent companies have reduced or eliminated matching 
contributions recently due to declining profits. Although it remains to be seen if this is a 
long-term trend, understanding the impact of matching is critical to understanding the 
impact of these changes on retirement income security for a workforce increasingly 
dependent on 401(k) plans for retirement.  The fact that the estimated response of 
contributions to the employer match in this paper was quite inelastic suggests that overall 
401(k) activity at these firms might not be greatly affected by these changes in matching.   
   38
References 
Agnew, Julie, Pierluigi Balduzzi, and Annika Sunden, “Portfolio Choice and Trading in a 
Large 401(k) Plan,” American Economic Review 93:1 (2003): 193-215. 
 
Amronin, Gene, Jennifer Huang, and Clemens Sialm, “The Tradeoff between Mortgage 
Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings,” Mimeo., University of Michigan, 
2006. 
 
Andrews, Emily S., “The Growth and Distribution of 401(k) Plans,” in Trends in 
Pensions 1992, John A. Turner and Daniel J. Beller, eds. (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor) 1992, pp. 149-176. 
 
Attanasio, Orazio P., and Guglielmo Weber, “Is Consumption Growth Consistent with 
Intertemporal Optimization?  Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey,” Journal 
of Political Economy 103:6 (1995): 1121-1157. 
 
Barksy, Robert B., F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball, and Matthew D. Shapiro, 
“Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the 
Health and Retirement Study,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:2 (1998): 537-580.   
 
Bassett, William F., Michael J. Fleming, and Anthony P. Rodrigues, “How Workers Use 
401(k) Plans: The Participation, Contribution, and Withdrawal Decisions,'” National Tax 
Journal 51:2 (1998): 263-289. 
 
Bayer, Patrick J., B. Douglas Bernheim, and John Karl Scholz, “The Effects of Financial 
Education in the Workplace:  Evidence from a Survey of Employers,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 5655, 1996. 
 
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler, “Naïve Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Saving Plans,” American Economic Review 91:1 (2001): 79-98. 
 
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler, “Save More Tomorrow: Using Behaviorial 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving,” Journal of Political Economy 112: S1 (2004): 
S164-S187. 
 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, “Taxation and Saving,” in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, 
eds., Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North Holland), 2003, pp. 
1173-1249.  
 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Daniel M. Garrett, “The Effects of Financial Education in the 
Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Households,” Journal of Public Economics 87 
(2003): 1487-1519. 
   39
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Daniel M. Garrett, and Dean M. Maki, “Education and Saving: 
The Long-Term Effects of High School Curriculum Mandates,” Journal of Public 
Economics 80 (2001): 435-465. 
 
Blomquist, Soren, and Whitney Newey, “Nonparametric Estimation with Nonlinear 
Budget Sets,” Econometrica 70 (2002): 2455-2480. 
 
Blundell, Richard, Martin Browning, and Costas Meghir, “Consumer Demand and the 
Life-Cycle Allocation of Expenditures,” Review of Economic Studies 61:1 (1994): 57-80. 
 
Blundell, Richard, and Thomas MaCurdy, “Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative 
Approaches,” in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Volume 3A, (Amsterdam: North Holland), 1999, pp. 1559-1695.  
 
Blundell, Richard W., and James L. Powell, “Endogeneity in Semiparametric Binary 
Response Models,” Review of Economic Studies 71:3 (2004): 655-680. 
 
Brown, Jeffrey R., Nellie Liang, and Scott Weisbenner, “401(k) Matching Contributions 
in Company Stock: Costs and Benefits for Firms and Workers,” NBER Working Paper 
No. 10419, 2004, forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. 
 
Browning, Martin, Angus Deaton, and Margaret Irish, “A Profitable Approach to Labor 
Supply and Commodity Demands over the Life-Cycle,” Econometrica 55:3 (1985): 503-
544. 
 
Buchinsky, M., “Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure 1963-1987: Application of Quantile 
Regression,” Econometrica, 62(2) (1994): 405-459. 
 
Burtless, Gary, and Jerry Hausman, “The Effect of Taxation on Labor Supply: Evaluating 
the Gary Income Maintenance Experiment,” Journal of Political Economy 86 (1978): 
1103-1130. 
 
Campbell, John Y., and Joao Cocco, “Household Risk Management and Optimal 
Mortgage Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:4 (2003): 1449-1494. 
 
Carroll, Christopher D., “The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some Macroeconomic 
Evidence,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1992): 61-156. 
 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, “Plan Design and 401(k) Savings 
Outcomes,” National Tax Journal, forthcoming, 2004. 
 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “Defined 
Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least 
Resistance,” in James M. Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 16 (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press), 2002. 
   40
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “Optimal 
Defaults,” American Economic Review 93:2 (2003a): 180-185. 
 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “Passive 
Decisions and Potent Defaults,” NBER Working Paper No. 9917, 2003b. 
 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “Optimal 
Defaults and Active Decisions: Theory and Evidence from 401(k) Saving,” Harvard 
University Working Paper, 2003c. 
 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, “For Better or 
Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior,” in David A. Wise, ed., 
Perspectives in  the Economics of Aging (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
forthcoming, 2004. 
 
Clark, Robert L. and Sylvester J. Schieber, “Factors Affecting Participation Rates and 
Contribution Levels in 401(k) Plans,” in Living with Defined Contribution Pensions: 
Remaking Responsibility for Retirement, Olivia S. Mitchell and Sylvester J. Schieber, 
eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 1998, pp. 69-97. 
 
Coile, Courtney, and Jonathan Gruber, “Social Security and Retirement,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 7830, 2000. 
 
Cunningham, Christopher R., and Gary V. Engelhardt, “Federal Tax Policy, Employer 
Matching, and 401(k) Saving: Evidence from HRS W-2 Records,” National Tax Journal, 
55 (2002): 617-645. 
 
Dammon, Robert M., Chester S. Spatt, and Harold H. Zhang, “Optimal Consumption and 
Investment with Capital Gains Taxes,” Review of Financial Studies 14:3 (2001): 583-
616. 
 
Dammon, Robert M., Chester S. Spatt, and Harold H. Zhang, “Optimal Asset Location 
and Allocation with Taxable and Tax-Deferred Investing,” Journal of Finance 59:3 
(2004): 999-1037. 
 
Das, Mitali, Whitney K. Newey, and Francis Vella, “Nonparametric Estimation of 
Sample Selection Models,” Review of Economic Studies 70:1 (2003): 33-63. 
 
Deaton, Angus, “Saving and Liquidity Constraints,” Econometrica 59:5 (1991), 1221-
1248. 
  
Diamond, Peter, and Botond Koszegi, “Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement,” 
Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003): 1839-1872. 
 
Duflo, Esther, William Gale, Jeffrey Liebman, Peter Orszag, and Emmanuel Saez, 
“Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field   41
Experiment with H&R Block,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4): 2006, 
forthcoming. 
 
Duflo, Esther, and Emmanuel Saez, “Participation and Investment Decisions in a 
Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues’ Choices,” Journal of Public Economics 85 
(2002): 121-148. 
 
Duflo, Esther, and Emmanuel Saez, “The Role of Information and Social Interactions in 
Retirement Plan Decisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:3 (2003): 815-842. 
 
Dynan, Karen E., “How Prudent Are Consumers?” Journal of Political Economy 101:6 
(1993): 1104-1113. 
 
Elmendorf, Douglas W., “The Effect of Interest-Rate Changes on Household Saving and 
Consumption: A Survey,” Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series Paper No. 1996-27, 1996.   
 
Employee Benefit Research Institute, Salary Reduction Plans and Individual Saving for 
Retirement, Issue Brief No. 155 (Washington, DC: Employee Benefit Research Institute), 
1994. 
 
Engelhardt, Gary V.,  “Consumption, Down Payments, and Liquidity Constraints,” 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28:2 (May) 1996: 255-271. 
  
Engelhardt, Gary V., “Have 401(k)s Raised Household Saving? Evidence from the 
Health and Retirement Study,” Mimeo., Syracuse University, 2001. 
 
Engelhardt, Gary V., “Pre-Retirement Lump-Sum Pension Distributions and Retirement 
Income Security: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study,” National Tax Journal 
55:4 (December) 2002: 665-686.  
 
Engelhardt, Gary V., “Reasons for Job Change and the Disposition of Pre-Retirement 
Lump-Sum Pension Distributions” Economics Letters 81:3 (December) 2003a: 333-339.  
 
Engelhardt, Gary V., “Nominal Loss Aversion, Housing Equity Constraints, and 
Household Mobility: Evidence from the United States,” Journal of Urban Economics 
53:1 (January) 2003b: 171-195. 
 
Engelhardt, Gary V., “Defined Contribution Pension Plans and the Measurement of 
Retirement Wealth: Implications for Studies of Pension Knowledge, Saving, and the 
Timing of Retirement,” Mimeo, Syracuse University, 2004. 
 
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Anil Kumar, “Understanding the Impact of Employer Matching 
on 401(k) Saving,” TIAA-CREF Institute Research Dialogue No. 76, 2003. 
   42
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Anil Kumar, “Sorting and 401(k) Employer Matching,” 
Syracuse University Mimeo., 2004a.  
 
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Anil Kumar, “Social Security Personal-Account Participation 
with Government Matching,” Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 4:2 (2005): 
155-179. 
 
Engen, Eric M., William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz, “The Illusory Effects of Saving 
Incentives on Saving,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:4 (1996): 113-137. 
 
Even, William E., and David A. Macpherson, “Factors Influencing Employee 
Participation in 401(k) Plans,” Mimeo, Miami University (Ohio), 1996. 
 
Feenberg, Daniel, and Elisabeth Coutts, “An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12 (1) (Winter) (1993): 189-194. 
 
General Accounting Office, “401(k) Pension Plans: Loan Provisions Enhance 
Participation But May Affect Income Security for Some,”  Report GAO/HEHS-98-5, 
1997. 
 
Gomes, Francisco, Alexander Michaelides, Valery Polkovnichenko, “Portfolio Choice 
and Wealth Accumulation with Taxable and Tax-Deferred Accounts,” Mimeo., London 
Business School, 2004. 
 
Gorman, W.M., “Separable Utility and Aggregation,” Econometrica 27:3 (1959): 469-
481. 
 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Jonathan A. Parker, “Consumption over the Life-Cycle,” 
Econometrica 70:1 (2002): 47-89. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan, “A Tax-Based Estimate of the Elasticity of Intertemporal 
Substitution,” NBER Working Paper No. 11945, 2006. 
 
Gustman, Alan L., and Thomas L. Steinmeier, “What People Don’t Know About 
Pensions and Social Security: An Analysis Using Linked Data from the Health and 
Retirement Study,” NBER Working Paper No. 7368, 1999. 
 
Gustman, Alan L., Olivia S. Mitchell, Andrew A. Samwick, and Thomas L. Steinmeier, 
“Pension and Social Security Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study,” in Wealth, 
Work, and Health: Innovations in Measurement in the Social Sciences, James Smith and 
Robert Willis, eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press) 1999, pp. 150-208. 
 
Hall, Robert, “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,” Journal of Political Economy 
96 (1988): 339-57. 
   43
Hausman, Jerry A., “The Econometrics of Nonlinear Budget Sets,” Econometrica  
(November) 53 (1985), 1255-1282. 
 
Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Jonathan S. Skinner, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving 
Incentives,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:4 (1996): 73-90. 
 
Ibbotson Associates, “Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation, 2003 Yearbook (Chicago: 
Ibbotson Associates), 2003. 
 
Ippolito, Richard A.  Pension Plans and Employee Performance, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Jappelli, Tullio, Jorn-Steffen Pischke, and Nicholas S. Souleles, “Testing for Liquidity 
Constraints in Euler Equations with Complementary Data Sources,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 80:2 (1998): 251-262. 
 
Johnson, Richard W., Usha Sambamoorthi, and Stephen Crystal. "Pension Wealth at 
Midlife: Comparing Self-Reports with Provider Data." Review of Income and Wealth 
46(1) (2000): 59-83.  
 
Joulfaian, David, and David Richardson, “Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred 
Savings Programs?  Evidence from Federal Income Tax Data,” National Tax Journal 54 
(2001): 669-688. 
 
Kusko, Andrea, James M. Poterba, and David Wilcox, “Employee Decisions With 
Respect to 401(k) Plans,” in Living with Defined Contribution Pensions: Remaking 
Responsibility for Retirement, Olivia Mitchell and Sylvester Schieber, eds. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press) 1998, pp. 98-112. 
 
Laibson, David, “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (1997): 443-477. 
 
Laibson, David, Andrea Repetto, and J. Tobacman, “Self-Control and Retirement 
Savings,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1998): 91-196. 
 
MaCurdy, Thomas E., David Green, and Harry Paarsch, “Assessing Empirical 
Approaches for Analyzing Taxes and Labor Supply,” Journal of Human Resources 25 
(Summer 1990): 415–90. 
 
Madrian, Brigitte C., and Dennis F. Shea, “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) 
Participation and Savings Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001): 1149-
87. 
 
McDonald, John F., and Robert A. Moffitt, “The Uses of Tobit Analysis,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 62 (1980): 318-321. 
   44
McGill, Dan M., Kyle N. Brown, John J. Haley, and Sylvester J. Schieber, Fundamentals 
of Private Pensions, Seventh Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 
1996. 
 
Mills, Gregory, William G. Gale, Rhiannon Patterson, and Emil Apostolov, “What Do 
Individual Development Accounts Do?  Evidence from a Controlled Experiment,” 
Mimeo., Brookings Institution, 2006. 
 
Mitchell, Olivia S., “Worker Knowledge of Pension Provisions,” Journal of Labor 
Economics 6 (1988): 21-39. 
 
Mitchell, Olivia, Jan Olson, and Thomas Steinmeier, “Construction of the Earnings and 
Benefits File (EBF) for Use with the Health and Retirement Survey,” HRS/AHEAD 
Documentation Report No. DR-001, Institute for Social Research, University of 
Michigan, 1996. 
 
Mitchell, Olivia S., and Stephen P. Utkus, “The Role of Company Stock in Defined 
Contribution Plans,” NBER Working Paper No. 9250, 2002. 
 
Moffitt, Robert A., “The Econometrics of Piecewise-Linear Budget Constraints,” Journal 
of Business and Economic Statistics 4 (1986): 317-328. 
 
Moffitt, Robert A., “The Econometrics of Kinked Budget Constraints,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4 (1990): 119-139. 
  
Munnell, Alicia H., Annika Sunden, and Catherine Taylor, “What Determines 401(k) 
Participation and Contributions?” Mimeo., Boston College, 2001. 
 
Newey, Whitney K., “Linear Instrumental Variable Estimation of Limited Dependent 
Variable Models with Endogenous Explanatory Variables,” Journal of Econometrics 32 
(1986): 127–141. 
 
Newey, Whitney K., “Specification Tests for Distributional Assumptions in the Tobit 
Model,” Journal of Econometrics 34 (1987a): 125–145. 
 
Newey, Whitney K., “Efficient Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with 
Endogenous Explanatory Variables,” Journal of Econometrics 36 (1987b): 231–250. 
 
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. “Incentives for Procrastinators.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 114:3 (1999a):  769-816. 
 
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. “Doing It Now or Later.” American Economic 
Review 89:1 (1999b):  103-124. 
 
Papke, Leslie E., “Participation in and Contributions to 401(k) Pension Plans: Evidence 
from Plan Data,” Journal of Human Resources 30:2 (1995): 311-325.   45
 
Papke, Leslie E., Poterba, James M, “Survey Evidence on Employer Match Rates and 
Employee Saving Behavior in 401(k) Plans”, Economics Letters 49, 313-317, 1995. 
 
Poterba, James M., “Employer Stock and 401(k) Plans,” American Economic Review, 
93:2 (2003): 398-404. 
 
Poterba, James M., Clemens Sialm, and John B. Shoven, “Asset Location for Retirement 
Savers,” in William G. Gale, John B. Shoven, and Mark J. Warshawsky, eds. Private 
Pensions and Public Policies. Washington: Brookings Institution, 2001. 
 
Poterba, James M., Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise, “How Retirement Saving 
Programs Increase Saving,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:4 (1996): 91-112. 
 
Powell, James L., “Symmetrically-Trimmed Least Squares Estimation of Tobit Models,” 
Econometrica 54 (1986): 1425-1460. 
 
Rohwedder, Susann, “Empirical Validation of HRS Pension Wealth Measures,” Mimeo., 
Rand Corporation, (2003a). 
 
Rohwedder, Susann, “Measuring Pension Wealth in the HRS: Employer and Self-
Reports,” Mimeo., Rand Corporation, 2003b. 
 
Shoven, John B., “The Location and Allocation of Assets in Pension and Conventional 
Savings Accounts,” NBER Working Paper No. 7007, 1999. 
 
Shoven, John B., and Clemens Sialm, “Long Run Asset Allocation for Retirement 
Savings,” Journal of Private Portfolio Management 1 (2) (1998): 13-26. 
 
Shoven, John B., and Clemens Sialm, “Asset Location in Tax-Deferred and Conventional 
Savings Accounts,” Journal of Public Economics 88 (2003): 23-38. 
 
Staiger, Douglas, and James H. Stock, “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak 
Instruments,” Econometrica  65:3 (1997): 557-586. 
  
Starr-McCluer, Martha, and Annika Sunden, “Workers’ Knowledge of Their Pension 
Coverage: A Reevaluation,” Mimeo., Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 1999. 
 
Summers, Lawrence H., “Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Model,” 
American Economic Review 71 (1981): 533-544.  
 
U.S. Department of Labor, 1993 Private Pension Plan Bulletin (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor), 1995. 
 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004 Economic Report of the President (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 2004.    
   46
Vanderhei, Jack, and Craig Copeland, “A Behavioral Model for Predicting Employee 
Contributions to 401(k) Plans: Preliminary Results,” North American Actuarial Journal 
5:1 (2001): 80-94. 
 
Vella, Francis, “Simple Tests for Sample Selection Bias in Censored and Discrete Choice 
Models,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 7:4 (1992): 412-421. 
 
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, “Limited Asset Market Participation and the Elasticity of 
Intertemporal Substitution,” Journal of Political Economy 110:4 (2002): 825-853. 
 
Ziliak, James, and Thomas Kniesner, “Estimating Life Cycle Labor Supply Tax Effects,” 
Journal of Political Economy 107 (April 1999): 326-359.   47
 Appendix A 
 
This appendix lays out the theoretical model in more detail.  Additional detail can 
be provided upon request.  This appendix is intended to be supplemental and, given its 
length, not published. 
 
Previous studies have had two important shortcomings.  First, they have not 
couched their analyses in formal models of intertemporal choice, even though saving 
involves the substitution of resources across time.  This means that previous estimates 
cannot be interpreted as estimates of life-cycle-consistent determinants of 401(k) saving 
necessarily, because the empirical specifications may not have been consistent with 
underlying utility maximization.  So, while the existing literature has provided quite 
informative descriptive analyses, it has said little about how 401(k) saving may respond 
to prospective changes in employer matching or what the optimal match rate should be to 
achieve a saving target.  Second, with the exception of Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and 
Metrick (2002) and VanDerhei and Copeland (2001), previous studies have failed to 
exploit the fact that multiple-match-rate schedules and caps on matching induce kinks in 
the budget set.
20    
 
To illustrate the kink, Figure 1 shows budget sets with and without matching in a 
simple two-period model of consumption (without borrowing) typically used in 
undergraduate textbooks.  Let  1 C  and  2 C  be consumption in period 1 when working and 
period 2 when retired, respectively, and 
l y1  be first-period gross labor earnings.  For 
simplicity, assume federal marginal income tax rates, 
F
1 θ , in the first period, and 
F
2 θ , in 
the second period, and no labor earnings in the second period.  Let 
SS W  be the present 
value of traditional Social Security wealth, r  be the gross return, and assume that Social 
Security is not taxed when retired.  Assume that the 401(k) is the only form of voluntary 
saving, and contributions, 
VOL Q , measured in dollars from right to left on the horizontal 
axis, are matched at a fixed rate, 
VOL m , up to a cap, 
match Q , based on the amount of the 
voluntary contributions.  The upper limit on voluntary contributions is 
max Q .  The budget 
constraint without matching is abcd .  With matching, it is abkhi , and from 0 to 
match Q  
(reading right to left, beginning at point a), the slope is 
                                                 
20 Both of these studies examined the impact of match rates and caps on 401(k) participation and 
contributions, but from rather different perspectives than in this paper.  Specifically, Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian, and Metrick (2002) examined large samples of employee administrative data from two firms, one 
that introduced a match of 25 percent up to 4 percent of pay and another that held the match rate constant 
but increased the match cap.  Their reduced-form estimates were not inconsistent with a relatively moderate 
substitution effect and a very small income effect.  Copeland and VanDerhei (2001) estimated the impact of 
match rates and caps using a reduced-form sequential-response regression model for 137 matching 
formulas and a very large sample of participants, in which a separate equation was estimated for each 
match rate the participant faced.  They, too, found evidence that matching raised participation and 
contributions.  Probably the biggest difference between these studies and the current paper is that the 
analysis below is based on a life-cycle-consistent empirical specification, constructs the household’s budget 
set (rather than the employee), and incorporates virtual income into the estimation. A companion paper, 
Engelhardt and Kumar (2003), provided a further discussion of the previous literature.     48
) 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( 1 2
F V F r m θ θ − + + − − , from 
match Q  to 
max Q , the slope is 
) 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2
F F r θ θ − + − − , and beyond 
max Q , the slope is zero.  At the match cap, 
match Q , 
there is a kink point, k , at which the match is exhausted.   
The introduction of the employer match with a cap has differential effects 
depending upon the location on the budget set.  For low levels of contributions, the 
budget set rotates outward, and there are opposing income and substitution effects, but 
for higher levels of contributions, the budget set shifts out in parallel, and there is only an 
income effect, for which contributions fall with the imposition of the match.   
Furthermore, once the match cap is in place, changes in the match rate, 
V m , may not 
induce changes in contributions if individuals are bunched at the kink point, k , and 
standard income and substitution effects are not well defined.   Instead, income and 
substitution effects on each budget segment are defined by the slopes given above and the 
virtual incomes shown in the figure, 
1 v y  and 
2 v y , respectively.  
 
By specifying a detailed theoretical framework, this paper represents a stark 
departure from the previous literature.  There were eight criteria that guided the model 
detailed below.  First, it should incorporate non-linear budget sets explicitly.  In 
particular, the budget sets individuals actually face are substantially more complicated 
than the ones depicted in Figure 1, because they may have multiple kinks due to variable-
rate matches, and there may be multiple kinks because there are multiple marginal tax 
rates, and contributions are tax-deductible, so that making a contribution may change the 
marginal tax rate.  Surprisingly, none of the previous studies even have accounted for the 
effect of taxation on 401(k) saving.  Second and third, respectively, the model should 
allow for goods other than consumption, such as leisure, that enter utility—because a 
change in the match rate may induce intratemporal substitution across goods—and for 
uncertain lifetimes and bequests, facets that are important to individuals of the ages found 
in the HRS.  Fourth, the model should allow for wealth accumulation in many forms, 
because 401(k) plan participants can save through means that differ from 401(k)s in 
terms of tax treatment and liquidity, especially those that have been identified by 
previous studies as potential channels for 401(k)-saving offsets: taxable and IRA wealth 
(Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1996; Hubbard and Skinner, 1996; Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 
1996); Social Security, defined-benefit and non-401(k) defined-contribution pensions 
(Gale, 1998; Engelhardt, 2001); and mortgage debt (Engen and Gale, 1998).
21  Fifth, 
when formulating the household budget constraint, the model should specify in detail the 
tax treatment of 401(k) and IRA contributions, respectively, IRA withdrawals, and the 
interrelationship between employer matching, 401(k) plan characteristics, and the price of 
leisure.  This is a critical part of the analysis because the non-linear-budget-set estimation 
requires that non-linearities be well specified, and it is something that has been omitted 
from previous reduced-form studies.  Sixth, it should allow for an uncertain rate of return 
and liquidity constraints, two central features of models of consumption in the literature.  
Seventh, in addition to the optimal asset allocation decision across the different forms of 
                                                 
21 Technically, 401(k)s are defined-contribution plans under federal law, but a distinction will be made 
throughout this analysis between 401(k)s and all other DC plans, where the latter category will be referred 
to as “non-401(k)” DC plans and includes plans such as money-purchase, ESOP, target benefit, and profit-
sharing plans.  The exact type of plan is indicated in the pension plan data used in the analysis.     49
wealth, the model should follow a series of papers, including Shoven (1999), Shoven and 
Sialm (1998, 2003), Poterba, Sialm, and Shoven, (2001), Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang 
(2004), and Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2004), among others, and allow 
for an optimal asset location decision, whereby the consumer must decide which assets to 
hold in taxable and tax-deferred forms.  Finally, it should be tractable enough to be used 
directly to formulate an econometric model of 401(k) saving that is consistent with 
intertemporal optimization.   
 
Formally, intratemporal direct utility,  ) ; , ( z l C U , is derived from leisure, l, with 
an associated price, 
l p , consumption of a composite good,C , with an associated price, 
c p , and a vector of demographics, z .  Intratemporal utility is weakly separable, and 
intertemporal utility is additively separable.  The consumer faces a per period probability 
of survival of ρ , with period T being the known maximum length of life.  With 
probability  ρ − 1 , the consumer dies and receives the terminal payoff  ) (
T W Φ , the utility 
of bequests, which is a function of total wealth, 
T W .  The lifetime is composed of two 
parts: from period N toΤ, the consumer is retired and no hours of labor are supplied to 
the market, so leisure equals the time endowment, 
l L ; from period 0 to  1 - N , the 
consumer works, and the timing of retirement in period N is endogenous.  Total wealth 
is accumulated in seven forms when working: wealth from IRAs, 
IRA W ; wealth from 
401(k)s, 
k W
401 ; wealth from non-401(k) defined-contribution pension plans, 
DC W ; 
wealth from defined-benefit pension plans, 
DB W ; Social Security wealth, 
SS W ; housing 
equity, 
H W ; and taxable wealth, 
TA W .  Each period when working, the consumer 
chooses consumption, leisure, voluntary 401(k) contributions, 
VOL Q , IRA contributions, 
IRAC Q ,  IRA withdrawals, 
IRAW Q ,  and the housing loan-to-value ratio, φ , (discussed 
below).  Each period when retired, the consumer chooses consumption, IRA 
contributions, IRA withdrawals, the housing loan-to-value ratio, and receives eligible 
pension and Social Security benefits.  Because 401(k) contributions can be made only 
while employed, the remaining description of the model focuses on the period when 
working, in the interest of exposition.
22  
 
The literature on optimal asset allocation and location to taxable and tax-deferred 
accounts has argued that, because capital gains are taxed more lightly than interest 
income in the United States, the consumer has the incentive to hold relatively heavily 
taxed bonds in tax-deferred accounts and relatively lightly taxed stocks in taxable 
accounts.
23  The model allows the consumer to choose the optimal allocation of IRA, DC, 
401(k), and taxable wealth between stocks and bonds, in addition to the choice variables 
described above.  Specifically, the model follows this literature and collapses IRA, DC, 
and 401(k) wealth into a single group, called retirement-account wealth, 
k DC IRA RA W W W W
401 + + ≡ , when formulating the intertemporal budget constraint.   
                                                 
22 Details of the complete model are available upon request. 
23 The obvious exception to this result is that tax-exempt municipal bonds should be held in the taxable 
account.   50
This is done for three reasons.  First, IRAs, DC plans, and 401(k)s are all tax-deferred 
forms of saving, in that contributions are not taxed when made, they allow for inside 
build-up at the pre-tax rate of return, and qualified withdrawals are taxed as ordinary 
income at the time of withdrawal, so, in principle, there is little, if any, difference 
between vehicles.
24   Second, federal law allows an employee to roll a DC or 401(k) 
account balance over to an IRA upon job severance, so, in practice, assets that were once 
accumulated in an employer-provided pension may appear on the household balance 
sheet as IRA wealth (Engelhardt, 2002 and 2003a).
25   Third, this assumption helps keep 
the model tractable.  Therefore, total wealth is defined as 
H SS DB TA RA T W W W W W W + + + + ≡ .       (A.1) 
Let 
h s  be the beginning-of-period share of total wealth in asset type h, 
H SS DB TA RA h , , , , = . 
 
  Defined-benefit pension and Social Security wealth evolve, respectively, as   








t W s W α + = +      (A.2) 
and  








t W s W α + = +      (A.3) 
For defined benefit plans, the accrual, 
DB α , is determined by a plan formula that is 
usually a complicated function of age, earnings, and years of service.  The Social 
Security accrual, 
SS α , is determined by benefit formulas in the federal law.  The model 




  Following Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2004), retirement-account 
and taxable wealth can be invested either in bonds, with riskless pre-tax return 
B r , or in 
stocks, with a risky pre-tax return  
1
1








t ,        (A.4) 
where π  is the constant inflation rate, d  is the constant nominal dividend yield, and g ~  is 
the stochastic nominal capital gain earned from the beginning of period t to the 
beginning of period  1 + t .
27  Throughout the analysis, a return with a tilde will indicate an 
                                                 
24  There is a clear distinction in the model between deductible and non-deductible IRA contributions.  
Related to this, note that Roth IRAs were not available in 1991, the calendar year of the empirical analysis 
below.   
25 There is very clear evidence of these rollovers in the HRS data used below.  In particular, there are 
individuals who have IRA wealth that is substantially higher than what they would have accumulated had 
they made limit contributions since 1981, when IRAs became legally widely available, at plausible rates of 
return.  Theses individuals also self-reported having rolled pension assets over to an IRA. 
26 Federal law prevents the use of Social Security or pension assets as collateral for loans, so that the 
illiquidity of these assets is a standard assumption in the literature.   
27 With respect to the empirical analysis described below, the HRS pension data tell whether employer 
stock was an investment option both for the employee voluntary contributions and the employer match, but 
only for plans that allowed individual-directed investment.  Unfortunately, for plans that did not allow for 
individual-directed investment, the HRS did not electronically code this information off of the SPDs, so 
that it is not known whether employee and employer contributions were required to be invested in   51
ex ante uncertain return, whereas one without will indicate either an ex post realization or 
a certain return.  Let 
RA R  be the weighted-average return on wealth in retirement 
accounts, 










t r r R + + + − ≡ ϑ ϑ ,     (A.5) 
where 
RA ϑ  is the share of retirement-account wealth invested in stocks.  Then retirement-





















t Q Q M Q M Q F W s R W − + + + + + + = +    (A.6) 
Some employers mandate 401(k) contributions, shown as
MAN Q  in (A.6), and the 
employer may match those mandatory contributions (Cunningham and Engelhardt, 
2002).  In (A.6), 
MAN M  is the employer’s matching contribution in dollars on the 
employee’s mandatory contribution, and 
VOL M  is the employer’s matching contribution 
in dollars on the employee’s voluntary contribution, 
VOL Q .  The matching functions are 








t y Q M M m =      (A.7) 
and 








t y Q M M m = ,     (A.8) 
respectively, and are twice continuously differentiable; 
l y  is labor earnings; 
VOL m  and 
MAN m  are vectors of plan-specified match rates for voluntary and required contributions, 
respectively.  In (A.6), F  is the employer’s non-matching contribution for the plan.
28  
The model assumes that DC and 401(k) wealth are illiquid until retirement and cannot be 
used as collateral, but allows IRA withdrawals when working (discussed below).
29 
 
  Housing equity is defined as  D P W
H − ≡ .  Housing value, P , evolves as 
t
P
t t P r P ) 1 ( 1 + = + ,        (A.9) 
where 
P r  is the return on housing value.  Mortgage debt is  P D φ = , where φ  is the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio, and D evolves as  
t
D
t t D r D ) 1 ( 1 + = + ,         ( A . 1 0 )  
where 
D r  is the real mortgage-interest rate, 
                                                                                                                                                 
employer stock.  Therefore, it is not possible to model and estimate the impact of employer stock on 
contribution behavior here specifically.  Poterba (2003), Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2004), and 
Mitchell and Utkus (2002) have studied various aspects of investment in company stock. 
28 These would be contributions the employer makes on a periodic basis, as specified in the SPD, but are 
not related to any voluntary or mandatory contributions by the employee: for example, those defined as a 
percentage of pay in a money purchase plan or as a function of some measure of firm performance in a 
profit-sharing plan.   
29 There are 401(k) plans that allow hardship withdrawals and/or borrowing against plan balances when 
working that provide some liquidity to 401(k) saving.  However, even though the SPD for each plan 
indicates whether, the extent to which, and the terms under which, hardship withdrawals and borrowing can 
occur, these features were not electronically coded by the HRS.  Therefore, liquidity through hardship 
withdrawals and borrowing could not be incorporated as choice variables directly into the intertemporal 
budget constraint.  Instead, the existence of these liquidity channels, for plans that offer them, are 













r ,       ( A . 1 1 )  
and 
D n  is the nominal mortgage-interest rate.  Equations (A.9) and (A.10) can be used to 


























) 1 ( 1 .   (A.12) 
In the model, the real mortgage-interest-payment portion on the right-hand side of (A.12), 
defined as 
T H D W s r B ) 1 / ( φ φ − ≡ , is required to be paid out of cash on hand and appears 


















1 .      ( A . 1 3 )  
  Finally, the equation of evolution for taxable wealth is  




















t T B Q Q Q C p y l L w W s R W − − + − − − + − + = + ,      
(A.14) 
where 
TA R  is the return on taxable wealth, 










t r r R + + + − ≡ ϑ ϑ ,    (A.15) 
TA ϑ  is the share of taxable wealth invested in stocks, 
o y  is other income, w is the gross 
hourly wage rate, 
l l y l L w ≡ − ) (  is labor earnings, and B  is the real mortgage-interest 
payment.
30  In (A.14), T  is the sum of income and payroll tax liability.  It is a twice 
continuously differentiable function,  
) ), , min( , ; , , (

















t Q D y I f T ⋅ =
− L θ θ θ ,   (A.16) 
of a vector of statutory marginal income tax rates, 
F θ , Social Security and Medicare 
payroll tax rates, 
P θ , and the penalty-tax rate, 
E θ , on early, non-qualified IRA 
withdrawals, which are defined by 
IRAW Age Q D ⋅
− 2 / 1 59 , where 
2 / 1 59− Age D  is a dummy 
variable that is one if the individual is under age 59½ and is zero otherwise.
31  Federal 













t G Q K Q Q Q y I − − + + − − = } ) {( ζ λ .    (A.17) 
The term in parentheses within the braces in (A.17) is income for federal tax purposes 
reported on Form W-2, the term in braces is adjusted gross income (AGI), and the term 
G  represents the sum of personal exemptions and deductions, and includes deductible 
                                                 
30  Because the mean age in the HRS sample below is 55, and Carroll (1992) and Gourinchas and Parker 
(2002), among others, have estimated that most lifetime income uncertainty has been resolved by this age, 
at which point households have transitioned from buffer-stock to life-cycle savers, income uncertainty 
likely was not central to the households under study and is not included in the model, but would be an 
important consideration in comparing the empirical results below to those based on a younger sample.  
However, note that, as stressed by MaCurdy and Blundell (1999), the two-stage budgeting empirical 
approach adopted below explicitly can handle multiple forms of uncertainty, including, for example, wage 
uncertainty, and, therefore, in principle, this assumption does not compromise the basic framework 
underlying the empirical specification.   
31  For simplicity in exposition, we have suppressed notation for state income taxes.  However, we include 
them in the empirical analysis below.   Engelhardt (2002) discussed lump-sum distributions in detail.   53
nominal mortgage interest for homeowners.
32  The term K  is taxable capital income and 
is the sum of taxable interest income from bonds and taxable dividend and realized 
capital-gain income from stocks.
33  The factor λ  is the fraction of IRA withdrawals that 
is federally taxable and depends on age and whether the withdrawal was qualified or 
not.
34   The factor ζ  is the fraction of IRA contributions that is federally tax-deductible.  
It depends on adjusted gross income (AGI), and itself is a function of 401(k) 
contributions and IRA withdrawals, because 401(k) contributions are excluded from AGI 
and the taxable portion of withdrawals enters AGI.
35  
P L  is a vector of covered-earnings 
caps for payroll taxes.   
 
  Equations (A.2), (A.3), (A.6), (A.13), and (A.14) sum to yield the intertemporal 
budget constraint that determines 
T
t W 1 + .  In addition, there are five other constraints on 
behavior.  First, following Deaton (1991), there is a liquidity constraint,  
0 ≥
TA
t W ,         ( A . 1 8 )  
which means that total per period full expenditure (also referred to as “full income” in the 
two-stage budgeting literature),  y , defined as 
t t t t
c
t t B l w C p y + + ≡ ,      ( A . 1 9 )  
must be less than or equal to total net cash on hand,  X , defined as beginning-of-period 
liquid taxable wealth and other income on hand, plus the market value of the leisure 
endowment, less the tax liability, plus any IRA wealth made liquid through a withdrawal, 












t t Q Q Q T L w y W X + − − − + + ≡ .   (A.20) 
Let t μ  be the associated Kuhn-Tucker multiplier.  This formalizes the assumption that 
401(k), defined-contribution, defined-benefit pension, and Social Security assets are 
illiquid prior to retirement.  Second, although IRA withdrawals help to loosen the 
                                                 
32  In the model, the housing service flow enters the composite commodity, C, and its rental cost for renters 
and the implicit rental cost for homeowners is subsumed into the price index,  c p .   
33  Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2001, 2004) have provided detailed models of consumption and investment, 
with and without tax-deferred assets, which specified detailed tax treatment of realized and unrealized 
capital gains.  
34 Engelhardt (2002) outlined and examined empirically in the HRS the federal tax treatment of non-
qualified pre-retirement withdrawals from 401(k) and IRA plans.  Federal law allows penalty-free 
withdrawals from IRAs at age 59½, at which point IRA assets become liquid; prior to 59½, tax-qualified 
withdrawals are allowed for a very limited number of reasons, and non-qualified withdrawals are assessed a 
penalty tax.  The HRS surveyed individuals who were 51-61 in 1992, so some in the sample analyzed 
below are eligible for qualified withdrawals.   
35  Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), IRA contributions were fully tax-deductible up to the 
limit of $2,000 for single individuals and $2,250 for married couples.  TRA86 limited the deductibility of 
contributions.  For single individuals, contributions remained fully deductible if adjusted gross income was 
less than $25,000, were linearly phased out for incomes between $25,000 and $35,000, and not deductible 
for incomes above $35,000.  For married couples, contributions remained fully deductible if adjusted gross 
income was less than $40,000, were linearly phased out for incomes between $40,000 and $50,000, and not 
deductible for incomes above $50,000.  Therefore, ζ varies according to a non-linear interaction of 
income, and marital status.   54
liquidity constraint by increasing total net cash on hand in (A.20), there are the following 








D Q ⋅ ≥
− 2 / 1 70 ,    [
0




t W Q ≤ .      [
L
t ϕ ] (A.22) 
In (A.21), 
2 / 1 70− Age D  is a dummy variable that is one if the individual is age 70½ or older 
and is zero otherwise, and h is the individual’s life expectancy.  Thus, if under age 70½, 
the withdrawal must be greater than or equal to zero, and, if age 70½ or older, the 
withdrawal must satisfy the minimum-distribution requirements under federal law that 
are a function of life expectancy.   Equation (22) states that the withdrawal cannot exceed 
the beginning-of-period IRA wealth.
36  Third, the minimum- and maximum-contribution 
constraints on 401(k)s and IRAs with multipliers in square brackets, respectively, are 
0 ≥
VOL
t Q ,      [
0




t L Q ≤ ,      [
L
t η ] (A.24) 
0 ≥
IRA
t Q ,      [
0





t L Q ≤ .      [
L
t υ ] (A.26) 
The terms 
VOL
t L  and 
IRA
t L  are the upper limits on 401(k) and IRA contributions, 
respectively.    
IRA




t L  is governed by the employer’s plan, but may not exceed the federal 
statutory maximum.
38  Fourth, the loan-to-value ratio must lie in the unit interval for 
homeowners, but there may be a minimum home-equity constraint─such as a 
downpayment constraint (Engelhardt, 1996 and 2003b; Campbell and Cocco, 2003)─that 
further constrains the LTV to be below some exogenous threshold, φ .  Formally, these 
constraints are 
0 ≥ t φ ,       [
0
t ς ] (A.27) 
t t φ φ ≤ ,     [
L
t ς ] (A.28) 
where  1 ≤ φ .  Finally, there are constraints on the shares of retirement-account and 
taxable assets allocated to stocks:  
0 ≥
RA
t ϑ ,      [
0
t ϖ ] (A.29) 
1 ≤
RA
t ϑ ,      [
L
t ϖ ] (A.30) 
0 ≥
TA
t ϑ ,      [
L
t χ ] (A.31) 
and 
                                                 
36 Note that the penalty tax on non-qualified withdrawals (e.g., those prior to age 59½) is accounted for in 
the taxes-paid function in (A.16). 
37 These limits apply to the sum of deductible and non-deductible IRA contributions.  
38 Leisure is not modeled as bounded by zero and the leisure endowment because 401(k) matching 
contributions are available only to those who work.     55
1 ≤
TA
t ϑ .      [
L
t χ ] (A.32) 
  To summarize, the only forms of “active” saving when working are through 
contributions to 401(k), IRA, or taxable assets; adjustments can be made to the mortgage-
debt position as well.
39  However, the primary technology for smoothing resources across 
periods when working is through taxable-asset saving, because 401(k) saving is illiquid; 
IRA contributions are not necessarily illiquid because of the availability of withdrawals, 
but IRA withdrawals may incur a tax penalty; traditional pensions and Social Security are 
illiquid; and the extent of mortgage borrowing is limited.  This means that the consumer’s 
optimization does not imply automatically that all active saving be allocated first to the 
tax-preferred asset with the highest net return, because, in the face of uncertainty, the 
consumer must balance the desire for a high return with the need for liquidity.    
   
Consumption and hours are not fully observed in the HRS, so that, from the 
perspective of the empirical analysis, it is desirable to work with the indirect, rather than 
the direct, utility function.  Specifically, let  ) ; , ( z p y V  be the intratemporal indirect utility 
function.  It takes as arguments the vector of prices of leisure and consumption, p, full 
income,  y , given in (A.19), and the vector of demographics, z .  Following Browning, 
Deaton, and Irish (1985), let  ) (
* T
t t W V  be the sum of current and future expected utility 
based on total wealth in period t.  The individual makes all decisions at the beginning of 
the period, based on the information set,  t Ω , after which, 
s r is realized.  E  is the 
expectations operator conditional on the information set, and β  is the discount rate.  
Then for any time t,  N < t , the dynamic optimization problem can be written as 
{
} , ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 (                             
)) / ( (                             
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t t Q Q Q y ϑ ϑ φ , , , , , , ; and there is 
a two-stage budgeting interpretation.
40   In the first-stage, the individual chooses full 
income, dis-saving through IRA withdrawals, the mortgage-debt position, and the 
portfolio allocations to stock of retirement-account and taxable wealth, and must allocate 
total “active” saving to three asset categories─401(k), IRA, and taxable wealth─to 
maximize the expected present discounted value of lifetime indirect utility.  Note that the 
                                                 
39 Amronin, Huang, and Sialm (2006) examine the tradeoff between prepaying mortgages and saving 
through tax-deferred assets in detail. 
40 The necessary condition for two-stage budgeting is that utility be weakly separable (Gorman, 1959).  The 
model assumes strongly intertemporally and weakly intratemporally separable preferences, so that a two-
stage budgeting interpretation is valid.  The choices of 401(k) contributions and portfolio shares do not 
apply when not working, where with regard to the latter it is assumed for simplicity that pension wealth is 
annuitized at retirement.   56
choice variable for taxable-asset saving is made redundant by the intertemporal budget 
constraint and does not appear explicitly in c.     In the second stage, optimal full income, 
* y , in each period is allocated statically between the goods that enter direct utility: 
consumption and leisure.   
 
The first-order conditions when working for 401(k) contributions, IRA 
contributions, and full income can be expressed as 
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V     (A.35) 
and 
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V z p ,   (A.36) 
respectively.  Note that subscripts indicate a partial derivative (other than t, which 
denotes time): for example,  I T  is simply the marginal tax rate; 
V
Q
k M 401  is the marginal 
employer match rate for an additional dollar of 401(k) contribution;  l y ζ  is the change in 
the fraction of an IRA contribution that is deductible for an additional dollar of AGI; and 
y V  is the marginal utility of full income.
41  
                                                 
41  The first-order conditions for the other choice variables are available upon request and are not shown 






This appendix describes the construction of and gives background on the analysis 
dataset.  Additional detail can be provided upon request.   
 
The sample consists of 1,042 individuals from wave 1 of the HRS who were 
employed in 1991, eligible for a 401(k), whose employer provided a SPD for the plan, 
and who had linked administrative W-2 and Social Security earnings data.  The 
restricted-access employer-provided SPDs are distributed as the HRS Wave 1 Pension 
Plan Detail Data Set (Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier, 1999).  This dataset 
contains plan type, eligibility rules, benefit formulae, employer contribution and 
matching formulae, early and normal retirement dates, and other information described in 
the SPD, but not any information for individual employees.  The W-2 data are distributed 
as the HRS Wages and Self-Employment Income in Covered and Non-Covered Jobs 
dataset (Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier, 1996).  The dataset is a cross-section for 1991 
because even though there are earnings and deferral data prior to 1991, there are no data 
on other income and wealth needed to construct full income prior to 1991 in the HRS.  
Some of the individuals in the sample worked in 1991 but were retired at the time of the 
first interview in 1992.  Exclusion of these individuals had no impact on the estimation 
results.   
 
There are four types of employer matching: fixed-rate, discretionary, profit-
sharing, and variable-rate matching.  Engelhardt and Kumar (2003) discussed these in 
detail.  Because the extent of matching is not always known in advance to employees 
making deferral decisions in profit-sharing and discretionary plans, these plans were not 
included in our sample.  The SPDs were used to construct the complete schedule of 
employer matching contributions for each individual in our sample and applied all 
relevant restrictions on plan eligibility in the SPD, including those due to tenure, hours, 
earnings, age, and vesting of the employer matching contributions.   
 
Because workers’ budget sets can have multiple kinks and, therefore, multiple 
points of non-differentiability, from changes in match and marginal tax rates, a smooth, 
differentiable budget set around all kink points was constructed, following the 
methodology of MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990).  Specifically, kernel regression of 
the implicit subsidy from employer matching and tax deductibility on the set of potential 
contributions from 0 to $9500 (the federal maximum contribution in 1991) by $50 
increments was used to smooth the budget set, using the Gaussian kernel, 
2 /
2
) 2 / 1 ( ) (
z e z K
− = π , with bandwidth chosen by Silverman’s rule of thumb, 
5 / 1 / 9 . 0 n m h = , where  ) 349 . 1 / , var min( x x iqr m =  and iqrx is the inter-quartile range.   A 
smooth marginal implicit subsidy function was constructed from the kernel-regression 
estimates.  The respondent-reported income in wave 1 of the HRS referred to behavior in 
calendar year 1991; hence,  A Δ  was formed by using taxable wealth in 1992 taken from   58
wave 1, taxable wealth in 1991, which was capitalized from 1991 capital income, a 
technique is commonly used in the literature, and 
TA R  constructed from a weighted-
average gross return based on returns in Ibbotson (2003).  Tax rules from 1991 were used 
to construct an IRA phase-out calculator to determine ζ  and  l y ζ , and household income, 
tax, and demographic data and NBER’s TAXSIM calculator (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) 
were used to construct marginal tax rates and taxes paid for each household.  The 
estimated kernel-regression function was numerically integrated to obtain the dollar 
amount of implicit subsidy for every level of potential 401(k) contribution, which, with 
full income, was used to construct virtual full income along all portions of the budget 
sets.    
 
For the private and public pension components in ω  in (18), individuals were 
divided into cells based on exogenous demographic characteristics and the Social 
Security covered earnings from 1951-1991 and W-2 earnings records from 1980-1991 
were used to calculate earnings histories for a synthetic-cell individual.  These synthetic 
earnings histories were input as follows: 1) into the University of Michigan’s Pension 
Estimation Program to calculate defined benefit pension wealth, 
DB W , accrual, 
DB α , 
and change in accrual for additional earnings, 
DB
l y α , for individuals with DB plans; 2) 
into the HRS DC/401(k) Calculator (Engelhardt, 2004) developed to calculate for 
individuals with defined contribution plans their DC pension wealth, 
DC W , non-
matching contributions and the effect of additional earnings thereon, F and  l y F , 
respectively; the impact of additional earnings on employer match on voluntary 
contributions, 
VOL
l y M ; required 401(k) contributions and the impact of additional earnings 
thereon, 
MAN Q  and 
MAN
l y Q , respectively; and, 3) into the Social Security benefit 
calculator developed by Coile and Gruber (2000) to calculate Social Security wealth, 
SS W , accrual, 
SS α , and change in accrual for additional earnings, 
SS
y
l α .  The effect of 
additional earnings on the employer match to voluntary contributions, 
VOL
l y M , was 
calculated assuming a 401(k) contribution of 50 dollars for all individuals (regardless of 
actual contribution level).   
 
Finally, the sample is likely non-random because it is based on individuals for 
whom the HRS was able to obtain 1) an employer-provided SPD for the 401(k) plan, and 
2) permission from the individual to match SSA covered earnings and IRS W-2 earnings 
histories.  To understand the exclusion restrictions that were developed, it is useful to 
note the manner in which the HRS obtained the SPDs and administrative earnings data.  
The HRS asked all respondents who reported being in a (current or past) pension-covered 
job to provide the name and address of the employer.  To maintain respondent 
confidentiality, the HRS attempted to contact the employer, not about the respondent’s 
pension(s), but more generally as part of a survey of pension providers in which the HRS 
requested copies of SPDs for the universe of pensions the employer provided (to all 
employees).  The HRS then “matched” from this universe the appropriate pension(s) to   59
the respondent based on the respondent’s characteristics, e.g., union status, method of pay 
(hourly, salaried, commission, piece rate), occupation, tenure, etc.   The “match” rates 
were well below 100 percent: 65 percent of those currently working in pension-covered 
jobs, 66 percent for the last job for those not working, and 35 percent for jobs held five 
years or longer prior to the current (last) job for those working (not working).  
 
There are a number of important reasons for the failure to match an SPD to the 
respondent.  First, the respondent may not have given correct employer name and 
address.  Second, the HRS may have failed to receive the SPD because the employer may 
have refused to comply with the pension provider survey, the employer could not be 
located at the address given, or the employer went out of business or merged with another 
company and no longer existed under the name given by the respondent.  Third, the 
employer may have submitted an SPD, but the HRS was unable to match the SPD to the 
respondent based on the plan detail and the respondent’s characteristics.  This is less 
likely for union and public sector workers, who are easy to identify and whose plans are 
easy to obtain, and more likely for workers whose employers had undergone mergers and 
acquisitions with subsequent plan modifications.   
 
  The exclusion restrictions were constructed as follows.  First, Form 5500 data for 
1988-1992 from the Department of Labor, Employee Benefit Security Administration, on 
the universe of pension plans with 100 or more participants and a 5 percent random 
sample of plans with less than 100 participants were obtained.  Second, plans were 
divided into cells defined by Census region, employment size category, one-digit SIC 
code, year, and union status (union plan vs. non-union plan).  The first exclusion is the 
incidence of pension plan outsourcing by cell in 1992, where outsourcing means the plan 
was administered by an entity other than the employer (weighted using sampling weights 
provided by DOL). The intuition here is that the HRS was less likely to have obtained an 
SPD from the employer if (on average in its cell) plan administration was outsourced, 
because more than one contact was needed (first the employer, then the plan 
administrator) to have received the SPD. (It may well have been that plans that were 
outsourced were better administered and, therefore, employers that outsourced were more 
likely to have returned the pension provider survey.  However, this was likely more than 
offset because the SPD request was significantly less likely to have been fulfilled when 
multiple entities needed to be contacted.) The second exclusion was the incidence of 
pension plan consolidation due mergers and acquisitions by cell from 1988-1992.  The 
intuition here is that the HRS was less likely either to have obtained an SPD from the 
employer or to have matched it to the employee if (on average in its cell) there had been a 
lot of plan consolidation, because plan names and detail were often changed upon 
consolidation.  Two other variables were used as exclusions for pensions on past jobs in 
our selection equations: dummies for whether the individual left the job because the 
business closed or was laid off, respectively.  These helped to measure whether the 
employer possibly was in financial difficulty at severance, which, if that resulted in a 
business failure, would have made it more difficult for the HRS to have obtained an SPD.   
 
There were three important considerations in constructing the instruments.  First, 
the instruments were drawn from the information set  t Ω .   Because t is 1991, all   60
information from 1989 and 1990 is in the information set and orthogonal to decisions 
made in 1991 under rational expectations.  Second, because the observed marginal match 
and tax rates depend upon 401(k) and IRA contributions, 
IRAz mz p p ⋅  and 
kz p
401  are based 
on first-dollar measures: the employer match on the first dollar contributed and the 
marginal tax rate at which the first dollar contributed is deductible (which equals the tax 
rate on the last dollar of earnings).   Third, to minimize dependence on individual-specific 
income and family size that might be correlated with saving behavior, the first-dollar 
rates were calculated for a synthetic individual of each marital status assumed to have no 
capital income, no children, under age 65, and taking the standard deduction—where 
marital status is assumed exogenous—with synthetic annual labor earnings constructed as 
follows: individuals were divided into cells based on exogenous demographic 
characteristics, and the cell mean gross hourly wage rate,  2 − •t w , was multiplied by 2,000 
annual hours, H .  Let the subscript • denote a synthetic measure and the superscript 0 
denote a first-dollar measure, then  












j T M p p ζ   (B.1) 
and 








t l y t I
kz
t Q T p
− • − • − • − − ≡ ζ ,    (B.2)     
where 
IRA Q  was set to one dollar for all individuals.     
 
It is important to note that the tax function for  p Δ  in the endogenous variable 
) ln( / ω
v y p Δ , is based on the tax system in 1991, but the tax function for the instruments 
is different because it is based on the tax system in 1989 (indicated by the subscript  2 − t  
in (B.2)-(B.3) above).  Figure 2 plots the federal marginal tax rate by real AGI (in 1991 
dollars) for a single individual under 65 in 1989 and 1991.  For individuals with AGI 
below $50,000, the functions are essentially the same, but differ for those above this 
level.  Specifically, above this income level in 1989, the marginal tax rate increased from 
28 to 33 percent due to the phase-out of the personal exemption.  However, the Budget 
Act of 1990 raised the top marginal tax rate to 31 percent and changed the phase-out of 
the personal exemption.  Therefore, the non-linearity in the instruments’ tax function 
differs from that for the endogenous regressor due to the tax-law change, which is taken 
as exogenous to the individual.   About 15 percent of the sample is affected by this 
differential non-linearity in the instruments.   
 
 



























































































Contributions in $200 Intervals Relative to the Kink Amount







   
Table 1.  Cap on Matching Contributions, as a Percentage of Pay, for  
Plans that Offer Employer Matching in the Analysis Sample 
 
Cap on Employer Matching 
Contributions  















Percent of  
Individuals 
Less than 2%  7  3.3  10  2.7 
2  11 5.3 12 3.2 
2.5  1 0.5 1 0.3 
3  19 9.1 24 6.5 
3.75  1 0.5 4 1.0 
4  23 11.0 40 10.8 
5 17  8.1  53  14.2 
5.5  1 0.5 1 0.3 
5.7  1 0.5 1 0.3 
6  56  26.8 109 29.3 
Greater  than  6%  32 15.3 57 15.3 
No  Cap  41 19.6 60 16.1 
      
Total  209 100.0 372 100.0 
Note:  Authors’ calculations from the HRS restricted-access pension plan data for the 209 plans associated 
with the 372 of the 1,042 HRS individuals in the analysis sample in plans with matching provisions. 
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0 to 24  9  4.3  11  3.0 
25  23 15.3 43 11.6 
26  to  49  5 2.4 9 2.4 
50  90  43.1 143 38.4 
51 to 99  22  8.1  34  12.4 
100  57  27.2 116 31.2 
200  3 1.4 4 1.1 
      
Total  209 100.0 372 100.0 
Note:  Authors’ calculations from the HRS restricted-access pension plan data for the 209 plans associated 
with the 372 of the 1,042 HRS individuals in the analysis sample in plans with matching provisions. 
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Table 3.  Sample Means of Selected Variables in the Empirical Analysis Sample,  

















































          















          
After-Tax Wage 
















          















          















          
Percent Female  47  47  47  48  45 
          
Percent White  82  81  85  86  78 
          















          
Percent Married  80  79  82  81  79 


















          
Percent with Plans that 
Allow Borrowing 
36 19  68  42  29 
          
Percent with Plans that 
Allow Hardship 
Withdrawals 
4 4  5  6  2 






























Percent with Plans that 
Allow Self-Directed 
Investment 
63  46 92 66  58 
         
Percent with Other 
Pensions at the Firm  
47  53 34 45  48 
         
Percent with Plan Limit 
less than Federal Limit 
80  73 92 76  85 
         
Percent with Plan that 
Allows After-Tax Saving 
23 9  47 26  18 
         
Percent that had 
Employer-Sponsored 
Retirement Seminar 
23  23 23 25  20 
         
Percent with a Spouse 
who has a Pension 
39  39 38 42  35 
         
Percent in a Union  34  39  27  28  43 
         
Number  of  Observations  1042  670 372 588  454 
Note:  Authors’ calculations based on the sample of 1042 HRS individuals working in 1991 with matched 
employer-provided pension plan data and W-2 data, excluding those in plans with discretionary and profit-sharing-
based employer matching provisions, as described in the text.   
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Table 4.  Mean Potential and Unused Employer Matching Contributions for the  
Sub-sample of Individuals Eligible for Employer Matching Contributions,  

































      
Potential Employer 
Matching Contributions 










      
Unused Employer 











      
Unused Employer 
Matching Contributions 










Note:  Authors’ calculations based on the sub-sample of 372 HRS individuals 
working in 1991 eligible for employer matching contributions. 
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Table 5.  Selected Parameter Estimates of the Effect of Liquidity Constraints on the Extent that 
Contributions are Less than the Cap, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




















is Below the Cap 
Tobit 
 
Amount Contribution is 
Below the Cap as a 
Percent of Pay 
Dummy if Has a Home  0.19  -0.524  -649.4  -0.014 
Equity Line of Credit    (0.198)  (171.3)  (0.004) 
        
Dummy if Financial   0.11  0.725  81.1  0.004 
Distress Due to     (0.291)  (202.4)  (0.004) 
Unexpected Medical          
Expenses        
        
Dummy if Financial  0.06  -0.569  -733.8  -0.017 
Distress Due to     (0.366)  (360.8)  (0.014) 
Unemployment        
        
Dummy if No Capital   0.23  0.552  220.1  0.009 
Income   (0.180)  (136.0)  (0.003) 
        
Education (years)  12.97  -0.077  -41.4  -0.002 
   (0.036)  (26.5)  (0.001) 
Note: This table shows selected parameter estimates from ad hoc reduced-form selection-corrected 
specifications of the impact of selected variables that proxy for the ability to borrow on whether and to 
what extent employer matching contributions go unused on the sub-sample of 372 individuals in 401(k) 
plans that offer employer matching.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The fraction of individuals with 
contributions below the cap is 0.54.  The average dollar amount that the contribution is below the cap is 
$953, which, for average pay of $33,377, represented 3 percent of pay.  The specifications also control for 
age, dummy variables if married, white, home owner, and can rely on private income transfers under 
financial distress, as well as a constant.  The selection equations for the specifications used the same 
exclusion restrictions as in Table 7 and explained in the text.  
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Table 6.  Selected Parameter Estimates from Ad Hoc Reduced-Form Specifications Similar  
to Previous Literature, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


























        
Dummy if Plan 





















































        
Earnings 
Entered as  
Quartic Linear  Quartic Quartic 
        
Match Rate   0.037  -0.042  -0.028  -0.005 
Elasticity (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.003) 
        
2 R   --- 0.31 0.34 --- 
Note: This table shows selected parameter estimates for ad hoc reduced-form models 
similar to those in the previous literature, estimated with the sample of 1042 
individuals described in the text.  Standard errors in parentheses.  In columns 1, 3, and 
4, earnings were entered as a quartic function and in column 2 linearly.  Additional 
explanatory variables in the specifications included a quartic in age, married, number 
of children, spouse’s education, a quartic in spouse’s age, and a constant. For the Probit 
equation in column (1) and the Tobit equation in column (4) bootstrapped standard 
errors reported for the match rate elasticity. 
 Table 7.  Selected Parameter Estimates, Marginal Effects, and Elasticities of 401(k) Participation, Standard Errors in Parentheses 















A. Parameter Estimates         
         
) ln( / ω y p Δ   -2.567 0.384 -0.093 -4.522 -7.209 -7.486 
  (2.233) (7.227)  (6.983) (6.712) (8.004) (7.504) 
) ln( / ω y p Age Δ ×   0.009 -0.083  -0.073 -0.024 -0.010 0.044 
  (0.033) (0.084)  (0.081) (0.078) (0.093) (0.092) 
) ln( / ω y p Female Δ ×   0.283  -0.520  -0.565 0.639 0.857 0.913 
  (0.367) (0.861)  (0.848) (0.891) (1.076) (1.030) 
) ln( / ω y p White Δ ×   1.070 1.570  1.406 1.498 1.057 1.006 
  (0.492) (1.131)  (1.126) (1.076) (1.209) (1.166) 
) ln( / ω y p Married Δ ×   -0.409  -0.792  -0.842 0.279 0.848 0.745 
  (0.460) (1.175)  (1.145) (1.089) (1.234) (1.192) 
) ln( / ω y p Education Δ ×   0.145 0.600  0.604 0.519 0.677 0.438 
  (0.066) (0.181)  (0.182) (0.165) (0.188) (0.190) 
κ   0.251 0.653  0.665 0.390 0.293 0.129 
  (0.059) (0.442)  (0.424) (0.416) (0.478) (0.500) 











p-Value for Test of Null of         
      No Match Effect  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
      No Selection   0.0908  0.0288    0.0394  0.0868  0.0762 
         
Selection-Equation  Exclusions:         
Plan  Outsourcing  -0.0829 -0.0929    -0.0929 -0.1173 -0.1321 
  (0.0272) (0.0267)    (0.0267) (0.0275) (0.0278) 
Plan  Consolidation  -0.1207 -0.1510    -0.1510 -0.1910 -0.1868 
  (0.0360) (0.0368)    (0.0368) (0.0402) (0.0400) 
Business  Closure  -0.0683 -0.0530    -0.0530 -0.0530 -0.0481 
  (0.0172) (0.0173)    (0.0173) (0.0170) (0.0172) 
Laid Off  -0.0225  -0.0110    -0.0110  -0.0067  0.0018 
  (0.0238) (0.0239)    (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0239)   70
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
B. Additional Controls         
         
Fringe Benefit, and Plan 
Characteristics?  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Interaction of firm size with Fringe 
Benefits and Plan characteristics  No No No No Yes Yes 
Occupation and Interactions of 
Occupation with Demographics, 
Fringe Benefits, Plan 
Characteristics, and Other 
Employment Characteristics? 
 
No No No No No Yes 
C.  Marginal Effect on Probability of Participation with Respect to  
           
Match Rate  
(additional $1 per $1 contributed)  0.0091 0.2695  0.4724 0.0944 0.1833 0.1997 
 [0.00001,0.0907]  [0.0243,0.5918]  [0.2747,0.6843] [0.00007,0.4798]  [0.0017,.6551763] [0.0173,0.7522] 
Virtual Full Income  
(additional $100,000)  -0.0027 -0.0807  -0.0283 -0.0549 -0.0598 
 [-0.0271,-0.00001]  [-0.1773,  -0.0073] 
-0.1416 
[-0.2050,-0.0823]  [-0.1438,-.00002] [-0.1963,-0.0005] [-0.2254,-0.0052] 
Net Wage 
(additional $1 per hour)  -0.0001 -0.0026  -0.0046 -0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0019 
 [-0.0008,-0.00001]  [-0.0057,-0.0002]  [-0.0066,-0.0026]  [-0.0046,-0.00001] [-0.0063,-0.00001]  [-0.0073,-0.0002] 
Marginal Tax Rate 
(increase of 10 percentage points)  0.0053 0.1583  0.2775 0.0555 0.1077 0.1173 
 [0.00001,0.0533]  [0.0143,0.3477] [0.1614,0.4020] [0.00004,0.2819] [0.0010,0.3849]  [0.0102,0.4419] 
Predicted Probability of 
Participation  0.97 0.86 0.57 0.94  0.88 0.81 
           
D. Participation Elasticity with Respect to 
           
Match  Rate  0.0021 0.0721  0.1907 0.0231 0.0479 0.0567 
 [0.0000,0.0216]  [0.0073,0.1641] [0.1139,0.2789] [0,0.1149] [0.0005,0.1743] [0.0048,0.2043] 
Full  Income  -0.0032 -0.1053  -0.2785 -0.0337 -0.0700 -0.0828 
  [-0.0316,0.0000]  [-0.2397,-0.0106]  [-0.4074,-0.1664] [-0.1679,0] [-0.2546,-0.0008]  [-0.2984,-0.0070]   71
         
         
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Net  Wage  -0.0013 -0.0416  -0.1101 -0.0133 -0.0277 -0.0327 
  [-0.0125,0.0000]  [-0.0946,-0.0042]  [-0.1611,-0.0658] [-0.0663,0] [-0.1006,-0.0003]  [-0.1179,-0.0028] 
Marginal Tax Rate  0.0013  0.0439  0.1162  0.0141  0.0292  0.0346 
 [0.0000,0.0132]  [0.0044,0.1000] [0.0694,0.1701] [0,0.0701] [0.0003,0.1063] [0.0029,0.1245] 
Note: Columns 1-6 of Panel A of this table present parameter estimates of (15) in the text.  For all columns, the sample consists of 1,042 individuals.  All the columns 
except the first assume prices, net wage, and virtual income are endogenous. Columns 2 and 4-6 present selection-corrected estimates using the exclusion restrictions 
discussed in the text and the appendix.  The parameter estimates for the selection term in the participation equation are shown in Panel A.  Panel A also presents 
parameter estimates for the exclusion restrictions from the selection equations. The estimates in column 3 are not selection corrected.  Panel B presents the additional 
controls included. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the regressors are shown in panel C.  Panel D presents estimates of elasticities of 401(k) participation 
based on the parameter estimates in panel A, evaluated at the sample means. For marginal effects and elasticities, bias-corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals 
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Table 8.  Estimated Marginal Effects and Elasticities for PIGLOG Utility by Demographic Groups 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 











Some College  College Degree  Graduate 
School 
            
Participation Marginal Effect   0.2259  0.1750  0.0670  0.1725  0.2177  0.2532  0.2633 
from the Match Rate               
 [0.0081,0.5900]  [0.0012,0.7843] [-0.1326,0.7177]  [0.0071,0.6336]  [0.0075,0.5620] [0.0146,0.8546] [0.0147,0.8736] 
            
Participation Elasticity with 
Respect to the Match Rate  0.0761 0.0714  0.0289  0.0729  0.0809 0.1323 0.0483 
 [0.0047,0.2030]  [0.0005,0.3192] [-0.0530,0.3131]  [0.0028,0.2667]  [0.0028,0.2057] [0.0078,0.4518] [0.0028,0.1620] 
Note:  This table shows estimated marginal effects and elasticities of participation with respect to the employer match rate by sex and education group based on the 
parameter estimates from the richest specification, shown in column 6 of Table 7, evaluated at the sample means. The elasticities are based on group specific 
participation probability and match rate. Bias-corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are reported in square brackets. 
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            Table 9.  Instrumental-Variable Parameter Estimates of 401(k) Contributions for Selected Variables, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                          Estimator 
 
 
Explanatory Variable  
Tobit with 
Selection 
IV Tobit with 
Selection 
IV Tobit  
without Selection 
IV SCLS with 
Selection 
IV Tobit  
with 
 Selection 
IV SCLS  
with  
Selection 
            
            
) ln( / ω y p Δ                      -11251 12602  12588 -8046 -12087  -41197 
 (5,629)  (20,400)  (20,314)  (18,199)  (15,811)  (18,411) 
) ln( / ω y p Age Δ ×      41 -367 -369  -106 32  231 
 (86)  (238)  (238)  (211)  (194)  (222) 
) ln( / ω y p Female Δ ×   -12 -7386 -7169  -5885  -2692  -127 
 (891)  (2471)  (2429)  (2236)  (2173)  (2611) 
) ln( / ω y p White Δ ×   2970 3636  3402 4639 2430  9228 
 (1326)  (3291)  (3274)  (3244)  (2523)  (3774) 
) ln( / ω y p Married Δ ×   -473 -4672 -4632  -4258  398  2334 
 (1083)  (3314)  (3283)  (3014)  (2501)  (2987) 
) ln( / ω y p Education Δ ×   578 1906 1898  1858 1290  1867 
 (159)  (521)  (515)  (475)  (405)  (514) 
κ   1006 4097  4047 3791 1712  1371 
 (141)  (1203)  (1202)  (1095)  (1064)  (1226) 
            
B. Latent Marginal Effects          
            
Match Rate  159  3925  3849  2389  2261  1522 
 (159)  (649)  (638)  (602)  (601)  (752) 
Full Income  -48  -1176  -1153  -716  -678  -456 
 (48)  (195)  (191)  (180)  (180)  (225) 
Net Wage   -2  -38  -38  -23  -22  -15 
 (2)  (6)  (6)  (6)  (6)  (7) 
Marginal Tax Rate  94  2306  2262  1403  1328  894 
 (278)  (901)  (900)  (795)  (666)  (788) 
            
              74
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
C. Parameter Estimates for Selection Term in Contribution Equation and Exclusion Restrictions in the Selection Equation 
            
Selection Term in 
contribution Tobit 
-7093 -7336    -6468 -4172  -3981 
  (3593) (3368)    (3157) (2104)  (2611) 
p-Value on Selection Term  0.0486  0.0296    0.0409  0.0476  0.1282 
            
Selection-Equation 
Exclusions: 
         
Plan Administration   0.08  0.08    0.08  0.12  0.13 
   Outsourcing  (0.03)  (0.03)    (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
            
Plan Consolidation  -0.12  -0.12    -0.12  -0.19  -0.19 
 (0.04)  (0.04)    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
            
Left Job Due to Business   -0.07 -0.07    -0.07 -0.05  -0.05 
      Closure  (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
            
Left Job Because Laid off  -0.02 -0.02    -0.02 -0.01  0.00 
 (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
            
D. Additional  Controls            
            
Fringe Benefit, and Plan 
Characteristics?  
No No  No No Yes  Yes 
Interaction of firm size with 
Fringe Benefits and Plan 
characteristics 
No No  No No Yes  Yes 
Occupation and Interactions 
of Occupation with 
Demographics,  Fringe 
Benefits, Plan Characteristics, 
and Other Employment 
Characteristics? 
 
No No  No No Yes  Yes   75
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
E.  Estimated Elasticity with Respect to 
     Total    
Match Rate  0.0061  0.0937  0.1193    0.1202   
 [-0.007,0.0202]  [0.0649,0.1818]  [0.0719,0.213]  [0.0736,0.2667]  
Full Income  -0.0206  -0.3213    -0.4115   
 [-0.0696,0.0241]  [-0.6226,-0.2222] 
-0.4085 
[-0.729,-0.2468]  [-0.9132,-0.2519]   
Net Wage  -0.0082  -0.1270  -0.1615    -0.1626   
 [-0.0274,0.0094]  [-0.2461,-0.0876]  [-0.2882,-0.0975]    [-0.3609,-0.0996]   
Marginal Tax Rate   0.0087  0.1340  0.1704    0.1718   
  [-0.0101,0.0291] [0.0926,0.2599]  [0.1029,0.3042]   [0.105,0.381]   
     Extensive  Margin       
 0.0007  0.0483  0.0745    0.0659   
Match Rate  [-0.0002,0.0197]  [0.0265,0.1003] [0.0448,0.1331]   [0.0366,0.1687]   
 -0.0023  -0.1654  -0.2554    -0.2254   
Full Income  [-0.0675,0.0014]  [-0.3433,-0.0907]  [-0.456,-0.1537]    [-0.5777,-0.1254]   
 -0.0009  -0.0654  -0.1010    -0.0891   
Net Wage  [-0.0265,0.0005]  [-0.1357,-0.0359]  [-0.1802,-0.0607]    [-0.2282,-0.0494]   
 0.0009  0.0691  0.1066    0.0940   
Marginal Tax Rate   [-0.0005,0.0281]  [0.0377,0.1432] [0.0642,0.1903]   [0.0523,0.2411]   
            
     Intensive  Margin       
Match Rate  0.0054  0.0455  0.0448    0.0544   
 [-0.0049,0.0157]  [0.026,0.0816]  [0.0267,0.0797]   [0.0337,0.098]  
Full Income  -0.0183  -0.1556  -0.1530    -0.1863   
 [-0.0539,0.0169]  [-0.2791,-0.0898]  [-0.273,-0.0919]    [-0.3353,-0.1158]   
Net Wage  -0.0073  -0.0616  -0.0605    -0.1327   
 [-0.0213,0.0066]  [-0.1104,-0.0354]  [-0.1078,-0.0363]    [-0.0457,0.0195]   
Marginal Tax Rate   0.0077  0.0649  0.0637    0.0778   
 [-0.007,0.0225]  [0.0373,0.1165]  [0.0382,0.1139]   [0.0483,0.1399]  
            
Note:  Columns 1-10 of Panel A of this table present parameter estimates estimating (15) in the text.  For all columns, the sample consists of 1,042 individuals, and the upper 
contributions limits are individual varying, as described in the text.  All the columns except column (1) assume prices, net wage, and virtual income are endogenous. The IV 
SCLS estimator of Newey (1986) described in the text is used in Columns 4, 6, 8, and 10. The remaining columns use the IV Tobit estimator of Newey (1986).  Columns 2 and   76
4-10 present selection-corrected estimates using the exclusion restrictions discussed in the text and the appendix.  Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the regressors are 
shown in panel B.  The units of measure for the marginal effects are the same as those in Table 7: for the match rate, an additional $1 per $1 contributed; for virtual full income, 
an additional $100,000; for the net wage, an additional $1 per hour; and for the marginal tax rate, an increase of 10 percentage points.  The parameter estimates for the selection 
term in the structural contribution equation are shown in Panel C.  Panel C also presents parameter estimates for the exclusion restrictions from the selection equations. The 
estimates in column 3 are not selection corrected.  Panel D presented the additional controls included.  Panel E presents estimates of elasticities of 401(k) contributions based on 
the structural parameter estimates in panel A, evaluated at the sample means. The elasticities on the extensive and intensive margins were calculated using the McDonald and 
Moffitt (1980) decomposition, respectively. For elasticities, bias-corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are reported in square brackets.   77
  
 
Table 10.  Estimated Marginal Effects and Elasticities by Demographic Groups 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 











Some College  College Degree  Graduate 
School 
            
Marginal  Effect    1153 1752  396  1178  1700 2366 2693 
from the Match Rate  [742,3013]  [902,3480]  [-232,2484] [611,3042]  [1080,3415]  [1545,3963]  [1788,4434] 
            
Total Match Elasticity  0.1202  0.1934  0.0540  0.1478  0.1804  0.3352  0.1306 
 [0.0773,0.3141]  [0.0995,0.3842] [-0.0317,0.3383]  [0.0766,0.3819]  [0.1146,0.3624] [0.2189,0.5614] [0.0867,0.215] 
            
Extensive Margin   0.0671  0.1035  0.0320  0.0825  0.0971  0.1726  0.0656 
(Participation) Elasticity  [0.0361,0.1996]  [0.0524,0.2491] [-0.0197,0.2172] [0.0349,0.2426]  [0.0557,0.2296] [0.0875,0.3709] [0.0341,0.1384] 
            
Intensive Margin 
Elasticity  0.0532 0.0900  0.0223  0.0654  0.0833 0.1630 0.0648 
 [0.0344,0.1146]  [0.055,0.1697]  [-0.0071,0.1212] [0.037,0.1393]  [0.0576,0.1453] [0.1195,0.2706] [0.0493,0.1059] 
            
Note:  This table shows estimated marginal effects and elasticities of contributions with respect to the employer match rate by sex and education group based on the 
parameter estimates from the richest specification, shown in column 9 of Table 10, evaluated at the sample means. Bias-corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals are reported in square brackets. 
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Figure 2. Marginal Tax Rates in 1989 and 1991
 
 
 
 
 
 